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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On July 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Ruling granting summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. (Addendum at 1-30) On 
August 24, 2004, the court entered a final Order and Judgment dismissing the case with 
prejudice. (Record at 000977; hereinafter "Rec ") On September 16, 2004, plaintiffs 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Order and Judgment. (Rec 000982) This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a 
triable issue of fact on their breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore 
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a 
triable issue of fact on their intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations claim. 
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore 
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a 
triable issue of fact that defendant's actions caused plaintiffs' injuries. 
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore 
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker,, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Defendant Deseret Certified Development Company ("Deseref *) is a "public finance 
specialist" that advertises that it works with clients "in assessing financial needs and in 
selecting the most appropriate public sector finance programs." What Deseret specifically 
does for clients is guide them through the Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan 
process. Deseret provides this service for a "contingent fee" in the sense that clients pay 
Deseret only if the clients get their SBA-backed loan. 
Plaintiffs sought Deseret's assistance when they were unable to get conventional 
financing for a proposed movie theater in Spanish Fork. With Deseret in their corner, 
plaintiffs were able to secure the necessary SBA-backed financing to build and open their 
movie theater. The plaintiffs were business novices at the time, and Deseref s assistance was 
critical, both with respect to the financing issues, and also on a broad range of issues 
concerning the creation and operation of a successful new business venture. 
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Unfortunately, Deseret decided not only to assist in the creation of plaintiffs' 
business, but also to assist in its destruction. Soon after plaintiffs' theater opened, while still 
actively advising and representing plaintiffs, Deseret took on as a client a second group of 
investors that sought to open a theater in nearby Payson (the "Payson Group"). Deseret 
and the Payson Group knew that the area's population was insufficient to support two 
theaters in such close proximity. They nonetheless decided to move forward because they 
expected the newer Payson theater to drive plaintiffs' theater out of business and therefore 
succeed. 
Their prediction came true. Deseret secured SBA-backed financing for the Payson 
Group's theater, and when it opened, revenues for plaintiffs' theater dropped precipitously 
and never recovered. Plaintiffs eventually filed for bankruptcy, losing not only their 
investment, but their life's savings as well. 
There is, of course, no prohibition on one company attempting to drive another 
company out of business. Capitalism is built on unrestricted competition between 
businesses. There are, however, certain service providers such as attorneys, brokers, 
accountants and agents that undertake to loyally represent the interests of their clients, and 
as a result are held to a fiduciary obligation not to take actions contrary to their clients' 
interests. 
Plaintiffs contend that by virtue of the extensive advice and representation that 
Deseret provided plaintiffs, Deseret took on fiduciary obligations and therefore could not 
represent a second client with contrary interests. The trial court, however, concluded that 
Deseret acted as a middleman arranging a transaction between plaintiffs and the SBA, and 
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therefore should not be held to an obligation of loyalty to the plaintiffs. The trial court's 
error was its attempt to sort this out on summary judgment. There is an extensive record of 
a complex relationship between plaintiffs and Deseret, and the question of whether Deseret 
acted as plaintiffs' agent and or fiduciary is a disputed issue of fact that should have been left 
to a trial. 
The trial court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact as to 
causation. Plaintiffs' theory, in this regard, was quite simple. The evidence is undisputed 
that the Payson theater would never have opened without SBA-backed financing, and the 
evidence is also undisputed that only Deseret could secure SBA-backed financing for the 
Payson theater. Finally, the evidence is undisputed that business at plaintiffs' theater 
dropped dramatically and never recovered after the Payson theater opened. The trial court 
thought this insufficient to prove causation because other factors might have caused that 
drop, such as bad management by the plaintiffs or poor movie choices. In effect, the trial 
court ruled that to raise an issue of fact on causation, plaintiffs had to eliminate all potential 
alternative causes of the catastrophic drop in their business. This, however, is not the 
burden on summary judgment. Plaintiffs were required to show admissible evidence that 
defendants' conduct was a proximate cause of their injury, and the drastic and irreversible 
drop in business following the Payson theater's debut more than satisfied that burden. 
Judge Howard struggled with the question of whether this case should be resolved by 
summary judgment. Deseret filed its first motion for summary judgment when the case was 
before Judge Laycock, and the motion was denied in its entirety. The case was then 
transferred to Judge Howard, and Deseret filed a second motion for summary judgment. 
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Judge Howard denied this second motion for summary judgment and set the matter for trial. 
In the course of pre-trial proceedings, however, Judge Howard began to have doubts about 
the prior rulings and sua sponte vacated the prior summary judgment rulings and ordered the 
matter reargued. After reargument, Judge Howard reversed the prior rulings and granted 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs submit, with respect, that in so doing Judge Howard became a 
fact finder, resolving disputed issues of fact that should have been resolved through trial. 
Statement Of Facts 
In reviewing the facts, it is useful to keep in mind the two related but analytically 
distinct services plaintiffs contend they received as defendant's client. First, plaintiffs 
contend Deseret acted as their agent, representing plaintiffs before the SBA. Applying for, 
using and repaying an SBA-backed loan is a complex process in which the borrower has to 
petition the SBA both for initial approval of the financing and later for any modifications 
that need to be made. Plaintiffs contend that Deseret petitioned the SBA on their behalf, 
making Deseret their agent for all matters before the SBA. Just like a lawyer making an 
argument in court on behalf of a client, Deseret petitioned the SBA on plaintiffs' behalf 
whenever necessary. 
Second, plaintiffs contend that Deseret acted as a business advisor, consulting on all 
aspects of plaintiffs' movie theater project. Just as lawyers, accountants or stockbrokers 
provide advice to their clients in their respective areas of expertise, Deseret provided 
plaintiffs the expertise it had developed from years of assisting in the creation of new 
businesses in the Utah market. 
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Although the "agent before the SB A" and "business advisor" roles are 
interconnected and at times overlap, plaintiffs will show in the Argument section that they 
support two separate bases for finding that Deseret owed plaintiffs a fiduciary obligation of 
loyalty. 
The start of plaintiffs* movie theater project and Deseret's offer of assistance 
Plaintiff Jon Triesault, along with his wife Elizabeth, his friend Raymon Bori, and 
Raymonds wife Stephanie, sought to open a movie theater in Spanish Fork. They later 
formed two corporations, Imagination Theaters, Inc. and Imagination Theaters Holding, 
LLC, which are also plaintiffs in this action. Mr. Triesault was the leader of the group. 
While he had a background in the movie industry, he had had no prior experience starting, 
operating or financing any kind of business. None of the four individual plaintiffs had any 
prior experience with, or knowledge of, SBA loan programs. (Rec 000544) 
*As with most new ventures, financing was the first order of business. Mr. Triesault 
talked with several banks about obtaining a loan, but these efforts bore no fruit. 
Conventional financing was simply not available. (Rec 000544) In the course of talking to 
one of the banks about a conventional loan, Mr. Triesault met Mr. Vanchiere, a Vice-
President of defendant Deseret Certified Development Company ('"Deseret"). Mr. Triesault 
described their first meeting as follows: 
Mr. Vanchiere came up to me and put his arm around me and said, I don't think 
you're going to get anywhere with the bank. But I like your idea and I can help you 
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get an SBA loan. And I can also help you get a bank that would also partially fund 
your project. (Triesault dep. 61)*• 
After receiving further information from Mr. Triesault on his plans for the movie 
theater, Mr. Vanchiere agreed to both be a consultant and advisor and to provide assistance 
in getting SBA-backed financing: 
(The theater] was my idea, but I had never done this before. I thought it was a good 
idea. Bur Mr. Vanchiere was the consultant and the advisor who was the motivating 
factor in saying, I believe in your idea. I can help you get this SBA loan. And I can 
also help you find a first position lender that will give you money - you know, 
another loan. I didn't know I needed two loans at this point He revealed all of that 
to me and guided us. (Triesault dep. 71-72) 
One particular area of expertise that Mr. Vanchiere brought to the table was his 
knowledge of the Utah business community. Mr. Triesault had only Uved in Utah a few 
years, but Mr. Vanchiere had extensive experience in starting local businesses: 
(H|e told me first that he could really be of assistance to us as an advisor because of 
his knowledge in this community. He knew I was fairly new here. 
He knew a lot more than I did about the business climate here in Utah County. 
And he told me - or lead me to believe that his opinion was very valuable. 
(Triesault dep. 83-84) 
Mr. Vanchiere made it clear that his advice would extend beyond the area of getting 
SBA-backed financing: 
Q. [Mr. Vanchiere] would help you get a loan. Anything else? 
A. That he would advise us as to the business itself and what he thought of it and 
what he thought about its viability. He would make suggestions to us. He would 
guide us along. He would work with our attorney. He would come down and take 
a look at it and he would follow along the development of the project. And we 
could call him for advice along the way. He was our mentor. (Triesault dep. 101) 
1
 The transcripts of the depositions of Jon Triesault and Mike Vanchiere are part of the 
record on appeal, but were not numbered by the clerk's office. They will therefore be cited 
by referring direcdy to the pages of the deposition transcript. 
7 
Plaintiffs relied heavily not only on Mr. Vanchiere's advice, but also his general 
opinion that the project was viable: 
Before meeting Mr. Vanchiere, the other plaintiffs in this matter and I had not 
completely committed ourselves to the theater project. To make it work, I was 
going to have to put my whole life-savings on the line. Mr. Vanchiere assured me 
that the project was economically viable and would work. (Rec 000544) 
Mr. Vanchiere proceeded to advise and consult with plaintiffs on every aspect of the 
project, including the number of screens the theater should have (Triesault dep. 87-88), the 
types of movies it should show (Triesault dep. 91), the kinds of decorations it should have 
(Triesault dep. 91), what promotions and other ways there were to get the community 
involved (Triesault dep 91), the corporate structure plaintiffs' should create (Rec 000542), 
and even how to run the concession stands. (Triesault dep 92-93). Mr. Triesault described 
this consulting as ^brainstorming" with Mr. Vanchiere where they would: 
talk about how the theater would develop and what we would do with it and how 
we could run it and how we could maximize our potential. (Triesault dep. 92) 
One of Mr. Vanchiere's most important functions was getting plaintiffs SBA-backed 
financing. Before moving on to the specifics of Mr. Vanchiere's role in this process, 
however, it is useful to pause and describe how SBA-backed financing works. 
The SBA's Section 504 loan program 
Plaintiffs applied under the Section 504 loan program, which provides long term 
permanent financing for small businesses. The financing typically involves a package with 
three components: the borrower contributes 10%, a private bank loans 50% and a certified 
development company loans the remaining 40%. The certified development company's loan 
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loan is funded by debentures that are backed by a 100% SB A guarantee.2 The defendant in 
this case is the certified development company. 
The SBA guarantee is the key to the whole scheme. Section 504 loans are made to 
businesses that are unable to qualify for private financing. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101. The private 
lender contributes 50% of the financing, but with a senior lien on all the project's assets. 
While the private lender would not provide full funding for the project, they will almost 
always agree to provide 50% of the funding, secured by 100% of the assets. The remaining 
40% is provided by a certified development company such as the defendant, which raises the 
money by selling debentures. The sale of those debentures is a simple matter because the 
SBA provides a 100% guarantee of their repayment. Thus, with the SBA guarantee in hand, 
a financing package can be created for small businesses that would not otherwise qualify for 
funding. 
There is, not surprisingly, a complex application process involved in securing the 
SBA's approval for a Section 504 loan. An applicant must show the SBA that it meets the 
general eligibility requirements for SBA loans (13 C.F.R. § 120.100), that credit is not 
available from any other source (13 C.F.R. § 120.101), that it is a kind of business eligible for 
an SBA loan (13 C.F.R. § 120.110), that it plans to use the loan proceeds for eligible uses (13 
C.F.R. § 120.120), that is meets the SBA's lending criteria (13 C.F.R. § 120.150), and that it 
meets a host of additional requirements specific to 504 loans. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 120.880 — 
120.923. A detailed application must be completed to show that all of the requirements have 
been met. 13 C.F.R. § 120.191. 
2
 13. C.F.R. §120.801; http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/financing/sbaloan/cdc504.html; Tide 
V of the Small Business Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. 695 to 697f. 
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Deseret's role in the SBA loan application process 
The existence of these labyrinthine regulations should not be unexpected; one is, after 
all, applying for financial backing from the federal government. Neither Mr. Triesault nor 
any of the other plaintiffs had any prior knowledge of the SBA loan process. They placed 
complete trust and confidence in Mr. Vanchiere to handle this for them and Mr. Vanchiere 
accepted this role. (Rec 000544) Mr. Vanchiere agreed not only to guide plaintiffs through 
the 504 process, but also to help secure the private lender that would provide the first 50% 
of the financing. (Triesault dep. 71) 
Mr. Vanchiere's offer to undertake the SBA application process on plaintiffs' behalf 
was consistent with Deserefs public statements about the services it provides for customers. 
Deserefs web site describes the company's role as follows: 
The Deseret Certified Development Company staff members are public sector 
finance specialists. They work with all types of businesses in assessing financial 
needs and in selecting the most appropriate public sector finance programs. 
(Rec 000306; emphasis added). 
This statement touting Deseret's expertise is also consistent with the services such a 
company is authorized to provide by federal regulation: 
Services a CDC [certified development company] provides to small businesses. 
(a) ... It must market the 504 program, package and process 504 loan 
applications, and close and service 504 loans.... 
(b) A CDC may provide small businesses with financial and technical 
assistance.... 
13 C.F.R. § 120.827 (emphasis added). 
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These statements are also consistent with The Standard Industrial Code Title Deseret 
selected for its filings with the Utah Department of Commerce. Deseret chose 6282, a code 
that means Deseret has designated itself a "seller of investment advice." (Rec 000305) 
The SBA considers many factors in deciding whether to grant a Section 504 loan, 
including the "strength of the business," "projected cash flow," and the "potential for future 
success." 13 C.F.R. § 120.150. The starting point for an SBA application, therefore, is the 
development of a business plan, and Mr. Vanchiere worked closely with plaintiffs on the 
preparation of this plan. (Rec 000271) Specifically, Mr. Triesault and Mr. Vanchiere 
discussed the fact that 10,000 people per movie screen was a generally accepted number used 
to determine the economic viability of rural movie theaters. Plaintiffs' proposed theater was 
going to have eight screens. The targeted market was from southern Provo to south of 
Nephi, an area that included approximately 80,000 people. Plaintiffs and Mr. Vanchiere 
concluded, therefore, that the proposed theater had a sufficient population of potential 
customers to support a successful motive theater. (Rec 000271) 
Mr. Vanchiere also helped plaintiffs prepare a statement of the theater's projected 
cash flow for the business plan by providing plaintiffs with the necessary formulas. (Rec 
000270) Plaintiffs viewed Mr. Vanchiere as the expert in creating a business plan that would 
pass muster under the SBA's criteria. (Rec 000268) 
Once all the required materials had been collected, Mr. Vanchiere provided plaintiffs 
with all of the necessary application documents and provided considerable assistance in 
filling them out. Those documents included the loan applications, personal financial 
statements, business plans and individual resumes. (Rec 000271) 
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Mr. Vanchiere advised plaintiffs what to include in their personal loan applications, 
personal financial statements and resumes. For instance, Mr. Vanchiere found out that Mr. 
Triesault had rental properties in California worth approximately $1,000,000.00. Initially, 
Mr. Triesault had not included those properties on any of the documents. Mr. Vanchiere 
advised him to include the information regarding his California rental properties in the 
applications and financial statements. (Rec 000271) 
Throughout this process, Mr. Vanchiere continued to provide advice that went 
beyond what was necessary for obtaining the SBA loan, encompassing general business 
advice on how to make the project successful. For example, Mr. Vanchiere suggested to 
plaintiffs that they needed to hire a manager to run the theater because they lacked the 
necessary experience, and plaintiffs proceeded to hire a manager. (Rec 000270) 
Deseret acts as plaintiffs* agent for all dealings with the SBA 
Once the application was complete, it needed to be submitted to the SBA for 
approval. First, however, Mr. Vanchiere and Deseret reviewed the application to decide if it 
would likely meet the SBA's criteria. (Rec 000269) Once Desert decided the application 
would likely be acceptable to the SBA, it was Deseret that submitted the application to the 
SBA, not the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not know where or to what office the application 
was submitted. (Rec 000269) 
From this point forward, all communications with the SBA were handled for 
plaintiffs by Deseret. To this day, plaintiffs have never had a single direct communication 
with the SBA. (Rec 000269) When plaintiffs had to petition the SBA for approval of some 
action they sought to take, Deseret would make that request for them. When the SBA 
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would respond to such a petition, it would provide its response to Deseret, not plaintiffs. 
(Rec 000268) 
One example of this is the SBA's Authorization For Debenture Guarantee, which 
was the SBA's preliminary approval of plaintiffs' application for SBA financing. The SBA 
sent this document to Deseret, not plaintiffs. (Rec 000258) Furthermore, the Authorization 
had to be signed by both Deseret and plaintiffs and returned to the SBA District Office. 
(Rec 000250) Presumably, Deseret returned the signed Authorization because, as noted 
earlier, plaintiffs had no direct communications with SBA. 
Deseret takes plaintiffs from preliminary approval to loan closing 
The SBA Authorization is a preliminary approval with many requirements to be 
fulfilled before the SBA-backed loan can close. Mr. Vanchiere continued to act during this 
phase as both plaintiffs expert business advisor and agent for all communications with the 
SBA. Thus, for example, Mr. Vanchiere continued to help plaintiffs with the theater's 
construction, which had to be completed before the SBA-backed financing could close. At 
one point during the construction, plaintiffs were over budget. In a meeting in his office, 
Mr. Vanchiere advised plaintiffs how to cut costs in order to stay under budget. He did this 
by proposing to shrink the size of the theater and going over the construction costs item by 
item. He continued to examine virtually every aspect of the costs of the theater's 
construction until the construction was completed. (Rec 000269) 
Plaintiffs' cost overruns eventually required an increase in their construction 
financing. This needed to be approved by both the SBA and Stearns Bank. Stearns Bank 
was the private lender that provided both the interim construction financing and later the 
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50% private lender portion of the Section 504 loan. Deseret handled this entire matter for 
the plaintiffs, communicating with both Stearns Bank and the SBA and successfully securing 
the necessary modifications to the financing agreements. (Rec 000268) 
Securing an SBA-backed loan is not a one-shot project. First, one must apply. Then, 
after preliminary approval, one must meet all the conditions for final approval. After final 
approval, one must continue to meet all of the SBA's requirements on an ongoing basis. Mr. 
Triesault understood that Mr. Vanchiere would make sure that everything that needed to be 
done with respect to the SBA financing was done, and that he would represent plaintiffs 
before the SBA whenever necessary, until the loan was fully repaid. (Rec 000268) 
The loan closing and Deseret's multiple roles 
On or about May 27,1998, the SBA-backed financing closed. At the closing, Mr. 
Vanchiere presented plaintiffs a huge stack of documents and told plaintiffs that, because 
they trusted him, they did not need to read any of those documents. Plaintiffs agreed and 
signed the documents without reviewing them. (Rec 000268) 
At this point, Deseret took on an additional role, because it became, in a limited 
sense, plaintiffs' lender. As is typically the case for 504 financing, there were two separate. 
loans. One loan, for 50% of the total, was from Stearns Bank. The second loan, which is 
the SBA-backed loan, is technically made by Deseret to the plaintiffs. We say "technically" 
because, although there is a loan agreement between Deseret and plaintiffs, Deseret did not 
provide a loan in the true sense of loaning its own funds. The money provided by the loan 
came from a debenture sold as part of the SBA's debenture pools, and the Debenture was 
14 
fully guaranteed by the SBA. Thus, Desert acted as a conduit in getting the debenture funds 
to plaintiffs. As the Authorization explains: 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) authorizes the guarantee of a Debenture 
to be issued by [Deseret] to assist Borrower.... The proceeds of the Debenture 
shall be used only toward financing the purchase [or lease] and/or improvement or 
renovation by Borrower [of the Spanish Fork movie theater]. (Rec 000258) 
Unlike a true Bank, therefore, Deseret did not loan out any of its own funds. Indeed, 
the actual disbursement of the Debenture funds and the collection of plaintiffs' payments 
were handled by Colson Services Corp., a New York servicing agent hired by the SBA. (Rec 
000088,000210) 
Deseret and Mr. Vanchiere continue advising plaintiffs and 
acting as their agent after the SBA-backed financing closes 
Plaintiffs' theater opened in Spanish Fork on November 26,1997, and the SBA-
backed financing closed in May 1998. Even though Deseret nominally became plaintiffs' 
lender after the loan closed, it continued to provide plaintiffs its advisory and agency 
services. (Rec 000268) Mr. Vanchiere, in particular, continued his constant role as plaintiffs' 
agent and business advisor. 
To fulfill his advisory duties, Mr. Vanchiere visited plaintiffs' theater on the average 
of two weekends per month and continued to advise Mr. Triesault and Mr. Bori on the 
theater's operations. (Rec 000268) During these visits Mr. Vanchiere consulted with 
plaintiffs on everything from what they should serve at the concessions stand to what 
movies they should show. Thus, before plaintiffs made a critical switch from second-run 
movies to first-run movies, they discussed the issue with Mr. Vanchiere. Mr. Vanchiere 
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referred to plaintiffs as "special favorites" and told plaintiffs to call him if they had any 
questions. (Rec 000267) 
Mr. Vanchiere also continued to advise plaintiffs on financial matters. For example, 
Mr. Vanchiere told plaintiffs they should never personally take any amount of money from 
the theater until the theater became profitable, and he checked to see whether they took this 
advice. (Rec 000267) In order to enable Mr. Vanchiere to provide this kind of advice, 
plaintiffs continually gave Mr. Vanchiere confidential information about how their business 
was doing. (Rec 000268) 
Deseret also continued to act as plaintiffs' agent with the SB A. For example, in 
August 1999, a neighboring property owner sought the right to use some of plaintiffs' 
parking spaces for a planned grocery store. The neighbor offered to pay $15,000 and other 
valuable consideration. Plaintiffs thought the deal made sense, but could not enter into such 
a transaction without SB A approval. On August 10,1999, Deseret wrote a letter on 
plaintiffs' behalf to the SBA seeking its approval. The approval was obtained the next day. 
(Rec 000267) 
Deseret's fees 
Deseret's services did not come for free. Plaintiffs paid Deseret $14,553 for a 
Processing Fee, and other miscellaneous fees of $9,681.50, (Rec 000092) for a total fee of 
$24,234.50 for the services provided to plaintiffs 
Deseret takes on a competitor as a client 
Plaintiffs' theater, which opened in November of 1997, had some growing pains and 
was initially not profitable. After approximately 9 months, plaintiffs, in consultation with 
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Mr. Vanchiere, made the decision to switch from second run to first run films. (Triesault 
Dep. 143). This decision had an immediate impact on their business, which soon began 
showing a profit. By the end of 1999, plaintiffs' business had turned the corner and was 
consistently turning a profit. (Rec 000538) 
Right about the same time, however, Deseret was actively working on a possible 
Section 504 loan package for a group of investors that sought to open a competing theater in 
Payson (the 'Tayson Group"), which is about nine miles from Spanish Fork, and directly in 
the target market area for plaintiffs' theater. (Rec 000267) Deseret and the Payson Group 
put together a business plan that targeted the destruction of plaintiffs' theater. While 
"destruction" may sound a bit dramatic, it is in feet precisely what occurred. Deseret knew 
that the proposed Payson theater was in the market area that plaintiffs were counting on to 
provide sufficient customers for their theater complex. (Rec 000267) The Payson Group's 
business plan specifically discussed and acknowledged that the Payson Theater would 
succeed only by taking substantial business from plaintiffs' theater and rendering that theater 
"no longer feasible" Thus, the Market Analysis for the Payson Group's theater stated: 
At first glance it appears that there may not be sufficient demand or population 
for the proposed theater; however, it should be noticed that a new project which is 
superior to existing supply frequently takes away market share from the existing 
supply — and in effect, makes the older projects no longer feasible, rather than 
the newer project. In the case of the subject property, it will be the only theater in 
this market with stadium seating and all THX sound system. Given this fact, it is 
reasonable that the subject property will be able to attract more than its "fair share." 
(Rec 000223; emphasis added) 
The previously existing first-run screens that the above-quoted analysis concludes will 
"no longer [be] feasible" include plaintiffs' theater. Thus, the Payson's Group's business 
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plan, which was prepared with the assistance and approval of Deseret, was designed to take 
market share from the plaintiffs' and make the plaintiffs' theater "no longer feasible/' Id 
Deseret submitted an application to the SBA on behalf of the Payson Group that included 
this business plan, and the SBA approved the proposed loan. (Rec 000228) 
There are two critical facts about this that are undisputed. First, the Payson Group 
could not have gotten funding from any source other than the SBA. In fact, it is a 
requirement for a Section 504 loan that the borrower be unable to secure any other 
financing. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101. Second, the only way to get a 504 loan in Utah at the time 
was to hire Deseret. (Rec 000459) Therefore, the Payson Group's theater would never 
have been possible without Deseret's assistance. 
Deseret was also dishonest in its dealings with the SBA. As shown above, the 
business plan submitted to the SBA on behalf of the Payson Group depended upon 
depleting the customer base of plaintiffs' theater. The Payson Group's submission to the 
SBA, however, never mentions plaintiffs' theater by name and never discloses that one of 
the theaters that will "no longer [be] feasible" is funded by an SBA-guaranteed loan. (Rec 
000235) The SBA was provided no information, therefore, revealing that it was being asked 
to approve a loan to one entity that was intended to cause a default in an existing SBA-
backed loan. Id Had the SBA known that, it surely would not have approved a loan to the 
second theater group. Thus, only by deceiving the SBA was Deseret able to get the Payson 
Group loan approved. 
The motivation for this activity would not seem terribly obscure. Deseret received 
approximately $24,000 in fees from plaintiffs' transaction (Rec 000092), and about $25,000** 
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more in fees from the Payson Group transaction. (Rec 000227) When Mr. Vanchiere told 
plaintiffs about the new Payson theater, he was apologetic and attempted to claim that he 
had had no personal involvement in that loan. (Triesault dep. 147) 
Plaintiffs* business is destroyed 
The Payson Groups' theater opened in or about April 2000. By July, 2002, the 
plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy. 
The evidence linking the opening of the Payson Group's theater to the decline in 
plaintiffs business is overwhelming. Plaintiffs' theater had begun to show a profit several 
months before the Payson Theater opened. After that theater opened, plaintiffs' theater 
never again made a profit. (Rec. 000538) 
The financial figures show the devastating before-and-after effect. On a gross level, 
for the 12 months prior to Payson theater's opening, plaintiffs' revenues were approximately 
$2 million, but just $1.4 million for the 12 months after the new theater opened. (Rec 
000538) 
One key measure of a theater's success is the amount of concession dollars per 
customer. From May 1998 to May 2002, plaintiffs' theater made average per capita 
concession sales of $1.80. At that time, movie theater industry standards considered a movie 
theater to be doing well if the theater made more than a $1.70 average per capita on 
concession sales. This shows that plaintiffs theater was well managed and potentially a 
successful operation, if attendance was sufficient. (Rec 000521) 
The opening of the Payson Group's theater had a direct and devastating effect on 
attendance. Comparing similar months, in May 1999 the attendance for plaintiffs' theater 
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was 42,813; in May 2000 attendance was 21,141. In June 1999 attendance was 49,058, in 
June 2000,18,856. In July 1999 attendance was 43,080, but in July 2000 attendance was 
28,712. (Rec 000520) 
For the year before the Payson Theater opened, plaintiffs' attendance was 
approximately 336,722 (Rec 000570), and revenues from concession sales were 
approximately $606,099.60. (Rec 000569) For the year after the Payson Theaters opened, 
attendance was approximately 231,717, and revenues from concession sales dropped to 
approximately $417,090.60. (Rec 000569) 
The Star Wars Episodes show with precision just how badly the opening of the 
Payson theater hurt plaintiffs' business. In May 1999, Star Wars Episode I came out and the 
theater had an attendance of 13,520 and $55,115.29 in admissions in the first week of the 
movie. In May 2002, Star Wars Episode II came out and the theater had an attendance of 
only 6,734 and just $26,188.71 in admissions in the movie's first week. (Rec 000569) 
In the aggregate, in the year after the Payson Theaters opened, plaintiffs lost over 
100,000 customers, over $600,000 in gross revenues and over $189,000 in gross concession 
sales. (Rec 000569) 
As a result of the bankruptcy, plaintiffs have lost the entirety of the $1.5 million 
personal investment in this business. In addition, the SBA is demanding payment from each 
of the four individual plaintiffs pursuant to their personal guarantees of the balance of the 
$1,000,000.00 loan. (Rec 000741) 
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The Trial Court Proceedings 
Plaintiffs' complaint contains four claims. Count I alleges breach of fiduciary duty, 
Count II tortious interference with prospective economic relations, and Count III alleges 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Rec 000005) The complaint also alleges a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Rec 000001) 
Deseret initially moved for summary judgment on Counts I, II and III, arguing that 
the undisputed facts showed that plaintiffs could not sustain those claims. The case was 
before Judge Laycock at the time, and she denied defendant's motion in its entirety. (Rec 
0000320). 
The case was then transferred to Judge Howard. Deseret prompdy filed a second 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that defendant's conduct 
had caused plaintiffs' injuries, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. At the conclusion of the hearing on this 
motion, Judge Howard denied the motion as to causation, but granted it as to the emotional 
distress claim. (Rec 0000620) Before an order was entered, however, plaintiffs moved to 
reconsider the dismissal of the emotional distress claim. (Rec 0000651) On May 5, 2004, 
Judge Howard issued a ruling granting plaintiffs' Motion To Reconsider and upholding the 
emotional distress claim. (Rec 0000741) Consequendy, on May 18, 2004, Judge Howard 
entered an order denying defendant's Second Summary Judgment Motion in its entirety. Rec 
0000888) 
A trial date was set and the parties proceeded to prepare the matter for trial. In the 
middle of the pre-trial proceedings, however, Judge Howard expressed concern over the 
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previous rulings on the summary judgment motions. No new evidence or legal argument 
had been presented; his concern apparently arose from giving the matter more thought in 
the course of conducting pre-trial proceedings. As a result, Judge Howard struck not only 
his own ruling on defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, but also Judge 
Laycock's ruling on defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Howard also 
cancelled the trial date and set a time for "re-argument" of the two summary judgment 
motions. After hearing argument, Judge Howard issued a Ruling on July 21, 2004, that 
granted defendant's motions for summary judgment in their entirety. Judge Howard ruled 
that there was no evidence to support any of the claims, and furthermore, even if there was 
evidence to support liability, there was no evidence showing causation. (Add 28) A final 
Judgment and Order was entered on August 24,2004, and this appeal followed. 
Plaintiffs appeal the entry of summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty and 
tortious interference claims (Count I and II). Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of the 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim (Count III). 
The trial court did not separately discuss the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim in its final ruling, except to state, "the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint 
with prejudice and all respective causes of action along with the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims Plaintiffs attached to each cause of action." (Add 29) The 
emotional distress claim was therefore dismissed because in the court's view its viability 
depended upon the existence of a vahd claim of unlawful conduct under Counts I, II or III. 
There will, therefore, be no separate discussion of the emotional distress in this brief, but it 
clearly should be reinstated if Counts I or II are reinstated as a result of this appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Count I - Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Plaintiffs allege that Deseret was a fiduciary 
because it was plaintiffs' agent in presenting matters to the SBA, and also because it was an 
expert business advisor in which plaintiffs placed great trust and confidence. The trial court 
rejected both of these bases for plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim because it found 
that: (1) although the defendant acted as plaintiffs' "voice before the SB A," the plaintiff did 
not "control" the defendant and thus defendant was not plaintiffs' agent, and (2) there was 
no evidence that plaintiffs placed the requisite trust and confidence in the defendant so as to 
create a fiduciary duty. Both of these issues, however, should not have been resolved on a 
motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs and the defendant had a long and close 
relationship, and there is ample evidence that defendant was, in fact, plaintiffs' agent, and 
also a trusted expert business advisor. A trial is required to determine the precise 
relationship between the parties. 
Count II — Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Relations: 
Plaintiffs allege that defendant's assistance to the competing theater in Payson intentionally 
interfered with its prospective relations with its customers. The trial court acknowledged 
that there are facts showing intentional interference, but ruled, as a matter of law, that the 
defendant did not use improper means, which is an element of the tortious interference 
claim. This was error because there was ample evidence that the defendant deceived the 
SBA into granting the loan to the competing theater, which it would not otherwise have 
done had it known the full facts, and defendant's actions constituted a conflict of interest, 
which violates the federally mandated standard of behavior for those assisting businesses in 
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the SBA loan process. These facts create triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant 
used "improper means," and thus summary judgment should have been denied 
Causation: The trial court ruled there was no evidence that defendant's conduct in 
arranging financing for the competing theater was the cause of the demise of plaintiffs' 
business. However, the evidence shows that plaintiffs' theater suffered an immediate and 
irreversible decline immediately after the Payson theater opened, and that the Payson Group 
could not have gotten financing without Deseret's assistance. That evidence, alone, raised a 
triable issue of fact as to whether Deseret's conduct caused plaintiffs' injuries. 
ARGUMENT 
All of the trial court's rulings were made on motions for summary judgment. When 
considering the record, therefore, this Court must consider the "facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Carrier v. 
Salt Lake County, 2004 WL 2659178 (Utah 2004). 
I. Count I; Breach Of Fiduciary Duty 
There are two types of fiduciary relationships under Utah Law, one created by 
contractual relationships, and the other implied in law: 
It has, however, been noted that there are generally two types of fiduciary 
relationships: 
(1) [T]hose specifically created by contract such as principal and agent, attorney and 
client, and trustee and cestui que trust, for example, and those created by formal legal 
proceedings such as guardian and/or conservator and ward, and executor or 
administrator of an estate, among others, and (2) [T]hose implied in law due to the 
factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the 
parties to each other and to the questioned transactions. 
First Sec. Bank ofUtabN^L. v. Banbeny Development, 786 P.2d 1326,1332 (Utah 1990) 
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Plaintiffs contend that Deseret acted as both types of fiduciary. First, plaintiffs assert 
that Deseret was a contractual fiduciary because it agreed to act as plaintiffs' agent for all 
matters before SBA. Thus, for example, when plaintiffs needed approval from the SBA for 
some action they wanted to take, Deseret would be the one to contact the SBA, make the 
presentation, and secure the necessary approval. If Deseret was indeed plaintiffs' agent, it 
owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as a matter of law. 
Second, plaintiffs contend that Deseret was a fiduciary implied in law because it acted 
as plaintiffs' expert business advisor. Fiduciary duties arise when one party places a 
particular trust and confidence in another (Id. at 1333), and plaintiffs will show that by 
agreeing to act as plaintiffs' expert business advisor, plaintiffs justifiably reposed special trust 
and confidence in Deseret, thereby creating a fiduciary relationship. 
A. Deseret Was Plaintiffs* Agent For All Matters Concerning The SBA. 
The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, Deseret did not act as plaintiffs' agent. 
The court found that plaintiffs "authorized Defendant to act on their behalf in obtaining an 
SBA loan" and that "Defendant... was their voice with the SBA" (Add at 6), but that 
Deseret was not an agent because it was not subject to plaintiffs' "control." There is a 
contradiction on the face of this conclusion. If Deseret was "plaintiffs' voice with the SBA," 
then Deseret must have been subject to plaintiffs' control. To be someone's "voice" means 
Deseret was stating to the SBA what plaintiffs wanted in the way of an SBA loan, which 
necessarily means it was under plaintiffs' control. See, e.g., Christean v. Industrial Comm'n., 196 
P.2d 502, 511 (Utah 1948) (an agent is "employed to represent another in contractual 
negotiations or similar transactions"). For this and many other reasons, plaintiffs will show 
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that there is ample evidence that Deseret acted as plaintiffs' agent, and the question of the 
existence of an agency relationship should not have been resolved on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Before examining the merits of this issue, there is one important bit of history. 
Deseret's initial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary claim admitted'Deseret was 
plaintiffs' agent: 
[Deseret's] representation of Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs' limited agent for the purpose of 
securing the SBA Loan ended once the Authorization was obtained. Thereafter, 
[Deseret] owed a duty not to the Plaintiffs, but to the SBA, as SBA's limited agent 
for the purpose of closing and servicing the SBA Loan. (Rec 000106) 
Deseret thus admitted it was plaintiffs' agent, arguing only that the agency 
relationship — and with it the fiduciary duty - terminated when the initial SBA authorization 
was received. Later, Deseret tried to ease away from this admission, arguing without much 
elaboration that it was not "plaintiffs' agent in the sense argued by Plaintiffs." (Rec 000154) 
At no point, however, did Deseret ever argue that it was not subject to plaintiffs' control, as 
the trial court found. The trial court based its summary judgment conclusion, therefore, on 
a position never taken by Deseret. 
Now to the merits of the trial court's conclusion on the absence of "control." There 
is no question but that control is an element of agency. An agent is one who undertakes to 
act on someone's behalf subject to that person's control. Restatement (Second) of Agency §1 
(1958); Mecham v. Consolidated Oil & Transportation, Inc., 53 P.3d 479, 483 (Utah App. 2002). 
What, then, does the evidence show on this issue? 
The first instance in which Deseret represented the plaintiffs before the SBA was the 
submission of plaintiffs' Section 504 loan application. (Rec 000541) Although there is no 
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copy of plaintiffs' application in the record,3 we know from the Authorization that was 
received that plaintiffs applied for $1 million loan for a movie theater in Spanish Fork. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs Jon and Elizabeth Triesault and Raymon and Stephanie Bori 
personally guaranteed the loan. (Rec 000087)) 
The question is who "controlled" Deseret's actions when tendering plaintiffs' loan 
application to the SBA, and the answer must be the plaintiffs. Deseret had no authority to 
submit an application unless plaintiffs told them to. Deseret had no authority to decide how 
much financing to seek, or whether the funds would be used for a movie theater or a 
restaurant, unless plaintiffs told them to do so. Deseret had no authority to decide who 
would personally guarantee the loan, nor the myriad of other particulars of the loan sought 
by plaintiffs, unless plaintiffs told them what to do. 
Mr. Vanchiere was certainly consulted on every aspect of the loan application and his 
advice was crucial in deciding how to present the proposal to the SBA. But relying on 
someone's advice does not mean that the person is not under your "control." Mr. Vanchiere 
could advise, suggest, influence or cajole, but he ultimately had to present the application 
that plaintiffs wanted. Mr. Vanchiere could even refuse to present an application for 
plaintiffs, but there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Vanchiere was not ultimately subject 
to the control of his client, the plaintiffs, when tendering that application to the SBA. 
3
 The fact that neither party thought the application relevant to the summary judgment 
motions reflects the degree to which the trial court's analysis varied from what the parties 
focused on. 
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Mr. Triesault's testimony repeatedly reflects that fact that, while plaintiffs always 
sought Mr. Vanchiere's input, and while they discussed nearly everything with him, plaintiffs 
made the ultimate decisions on the nature of their project: 
Kind of seating: "In our particular case we decided on going with auditorium 
seating with an additional slope." (Triesault dep. 77) 
Number of screens: "Q. ... Did he recommend it or did he just validate what you 
suggested [as to the number of screens]?" 
"A. I've forgotten whether he validated or suggested. There were conversations 
concerning many aspects of the physical plant and the operation itself. He offered 
quite a few ideas and suggestions about the theater as we were developing. I never 
separated them out." (Triesault dep. 88) 
Type of movies: "I had the idea of a family values theater, but we took it further 
after talking with Mr. Vanchiere. We did additional things to make it family 
friendly." (Triesault dep. 91) 
Equipment: "I ran all kinds of - just about everything past Mr. Vanchiere just to 
get his read of it And sometimes he would have an opinion on something and 
sometimes he wouldn't." (Triesault dep. 117) 
Getting additional funds: "Q. What did you understand the consequences of a 
glitch of needing more money to be potentially with respect to the SBA 
authorization. 
"A. I knew that Mike was gong to have to go and ask for an authorization to get 
more." (Triesault dep. 127). 
Mr. Triesault eventually summed up the role Mr. Vanchiere played: 
"My impression was that Mike Vanchiere was acting as our advocate to see that we 
had a business project that could stand on its own and the he would help us through 
the 504 loan process. That he acted as our mentor and as our loan arranger and 
guide in this process." (Triesault dep. 135) 
This testimony shows that plaintiffs, although heavily dependent on Mr. Vanchiere's 
expertise and advice, were seeking financing for their business project. Plaintiffs ultimately 
28 
decided what kind of business they wanted to be in. Deseret was under plaintiffs' control 
because what it agreed to do was get SBA approval for the project plaintiffs chose. 
After plaintiffs received the authorization from the SBA, the terms of the financing 
had to be modified because of cost overruns. Consequently, on December 5,1997, Deseret 
wrote a letter to the SBA asking for certain modifications to the terms of the financing. (Rec 
000081) Deseret likely advised plaintiffs that SBA approval was needed, and how to go 
about getting that SBA approval. When writing to the SBA, however, Deseret was doing 
what plaintiffs wanted by getting the SBA approval plaintiffs needed because of cost 
overruns. 
These facts, plaintiffs submit, would seem to show that it is undisputed that Deseret 
was under plaintiffs' control. The question presented by this appeal, however, is only 
whether there is enough evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that Deseret was acting as 
plaintiffs' agent. When the facts are viewed in the light most favorably to plaintiffs, there is 
clearly evidence that Deseret was under plaintiffs' control, and thus the question of whether 
Deseret was plaintiffs' agent should not have been resolved through summary judgment. 
The trial court confused plaintiffs' reliance on Deseret's expert advice with the ability 
to control what Deseret presented to the SBA. Thus, the trial court noted "Defendant 
directed Plaintiffs on how to conduct their business." (Add. at 7) The testimony quoted 
above, however, shows only that plaintiffs relied on defendant's advice and expertise, and 
this does not preclude the element of control. The perfect illustration of this is the lawyer-
client relationship. Clients typically rely heavily on their lawyer's advice, but lawyers have 
always been held to be the agents of their clients, because a lawyer ultimately can only seek 
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what the client wants and is therefore subject to the client's control. Ditty v. Checkrite, IJd, 
Inc., 973 F.Supp. 1320,1334 (D.Utah 1997). 
In the realm of agency law, Deseret is considered an independent contractor that is 
an agent. Deseret was an independent contractor because plaintiffs did not control its 
physical conduct,4 but it was an agent because its task was to represent its clients. The 
Restatement points out that this is a very common arrangement: 
In fact, most of the person known as agents, that is, brokers, factors, attorneys, 
collection agencies, and selling agencies are independent contractors as the term is 
used in the Restatement of this Subject, since they are contractors, but, although 
employed to perform services, are not subject to the control or right of control of 
the principal with respect to their physical conduct in the performance of the 
services. However, they fall with the category of agents. They are fiduciaries; they 
owe to the principal the basic obligations of agency: loyalty and obedience. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14N, comment a (1958). 
The trial court concluded that Deseret acted as a "middleman" because it represented 
plaintiffs before the SBA for its own purposes — to foster economic growth. The fact that 
Deseret has an underlying goal of fostering economic growth in Utah, however, does not 
undermine the fact that when it communicated with the SBA on plaintiffs' specific loan, it 
was doing what plaintiffs wanted it to do. 
The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether Deseret's status as an agent 
can be decided as a matter of law, rather than at a trial. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the 
evidence discussed above would permit a fact finder to conclude that in communicating with 
4
 When a principal controls the physical conduct of an agent, there is a master servant 
relationship, the most common example of which is the employer/employee relationship. 
Domett v. Dowsett, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1949). An agent not subject to physical control 
by the principal is an independent contractor. Id 
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the SBA Deseret was acting as plaintiffs' agent, and therefore the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Deseret under this theory. 
B. The Impact Of The SBA's Regulations 
And Standard Operating Procedures. 
The trial court initially noted that the SBA's regulations were not controlling because 
this is a common law claim. If Deseret acted as an agent, federal regulations cannot undo 
that, and if Deseret did not act as an agent, federal regulations cannot make them an agent. 
The trial court nonetheless noted that it found some support in an internal SBA operating 
procedure. Although these matters are marginally relevant, we note that the trial court erred 
in its reading of the SBA's regulations and operating procedures. 
There are two relevant pronouncements. First, an SBA regulation defines an "agent" 
as follows (13 C.F.R. § 103.1): 
(a) ... an authorized representative, including an attorney, accountant, consultant, 
packager, lender service provider, or any other person representing an applicant or 
participant by conducing business with SBA. 
(b) The term conduct business with SBA means: 
(1) Preparing or submitting on behalf of an applicant an application for financial 
assistance of any kind.... 
Deseret is an "agent" under this definition because it has never denied that it 
"submitted" an application for financial assistance to the SBA on behalf of plaintiffs. 
Indeed, Mr. Vanchiere admitted in his deposition that Deseret was an agent under the 
definition in this federal regulation. (Vanchiere Dep. 32) 
In addition to the above-quoted Regulation, which is part of an extensive set of 
official regulations governing the SBA loan programs, the SBA has issued an internal manual 
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of standard operating procedures. That manual contains a statement that under the Section 
504 loan program, certified development companies such as Deseret are not "agents." SOP-
10(4) Subpart A, chapter 6. This raises the question of how to reconcile the Regulation 
quoted above with the statement in this standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs submit that 
the reconciliation can be found in the multiple roles played by certified development 
companies under a Section 504 loan. In addition to acting as the applicant's agent and 
advisor, unlike other SBA programs, in a Section 504 loan the certified development 
company also loans money to the applicant. When providing the loan, certified 
development companies are not acting as agents. That, however, does not negate that fact 
that if they choose to provide assistance to applicants in preparing and presenting their 
applications to the SBA, certified development companies also act as agents for the 
borrowers. The standard operating procedure, therefore, is not suggesting that certified 
development companies never act as agents in connection with 504 loans, but only that they 
are not agents when loaning money to applicants. 
In the final analysis, the Regulation and the standard operating procedure are not 
determinative of the factual question of whether Deseret acted as an agent. Furthermore, as 
the above analysis shows, they would appear to create more confusion than clarity. 
Nonetheless, to the extent they have some value, the pronouncement most directly relevant 
is the federal Regulation that provides that those who prepare or submit applications on 
behalf of potential borrowers are considered agents, and that is precisely what Deseret did 
for the plaintiffs. 
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C. Deseret's Fiduciary Duty Precluded 
Providing Assistance To The Payson Group. 
The trial court held, in the alternative, that if Deseret was plaintiffs' agent, its 
fiduciary duty was not broad enough to preclude providing assistance to the Payson Group. 
This issue should have been decided at a trial. 
The trial court began in the correct place, by noting that an agent owes a fiduciary 
duty only with respect to matters within the scope of its agency. Restatement (Second) Of 
-Agency §13 (1958). The alleged breach here, however, related to a matter direcdy within the 
scope of the agency. The scope of Deseret's agency was obtaining SBA-backed financing to 
fund plaintiffs' movie theater. The breach was providing assistance to a competing venture 
that caused the very venture that was the subject of the agency to fail. Deseret's actions with 
respect to the Payson Group caused plaintiffs to default on the very loan Deseret, acting as 
an agent, had secured. It is hard to imagine a much closer connection between an agent's 
actions and the scope of the agency. 
One of the specific prohibitions on an agent is working for a competitor: 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act 
during the period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of 
the principal in matters in which the agent is employed. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394 (1958). Deseret's work with the Payson Group plainly 
violated this prohibition on an agent's conduct. See a/so, Prince, Yeates & Geld^ahler v. Young, 
94 P.3d 179,184 (Utah 2004) ("an agent is subject to a duty not to compete with the 
principal concerning the subject matter of his agency"). 
The trial court relied on the fact that Deseret loaned money to plaintiffs, and from 
this concluded that it could not be a fiduciary. The court found support for this from the 
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"fact" that should plaintiffs default on the loan, Deseret would have to sue plaintiffs. The 
trial court's logic is flawed because Deseret can and did wear multiple hats. While it is true 
Deseret loaned money to plaintiffs — which is not a fiduciary act — Deseret continued to act 
as an agent and expert advisor and thus continued in its fiduciary role. Many courts have 
held that banks can be both lenders and fiduciaries. For example, in Mancuso v. United Bank 
of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 738 (Colo. 1991), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of a bank on this very issue: 
When a bank moves into the role of an advisor, the resulting relationship extends 
beyond the relationship of debtor and creditor and may give rise to higher duties. 
A Florida court reached the same conclusion in Capital Bank v. MVB Co., 644 So.2d 
515, 519 (HaJVpp. 1994): 
Generally, the relationship between a bank and its borrower is that of creditor to 
debtor, in which parties engage in arms-lengtfi transactions, and the bank owes no 
fiduciary responsibilities, [citations omitted] However,... [i]n BarnettBank of West 
Florida v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d at 923, the Florida Supreme Court found that a fiduciary 
relationship arose between a lender and a customer from the parties' established 
relationship of trust and confidence. 
Accord, Security Pacific National Bank v. Williams, 262 CaLRptr. 260,278 (CtApp. 1989) ("while 
there exists no per se fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customers, a fiduciary 
duty may nevertheless arise from their business relationship when the customer reposes trust 
in a bank and relies on the bank for financial advice or under other special circumstances/"); 
Deist v. Wachhofy 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984) ("modern banking practices involve a highly 
complicated structure of credit and other complexities which often thrust a bank into the 
role of an advisor, thereby creating a relationship of trust and confidence which may result in 
a fiduciary duty upon the bank"); Tokar^ v. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, 656 P.2d 
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1089 (Wash.App. 1983); Steelvest, Inc. v. ScansteelService Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) 
("The bank may have breached this fiduciary relationship by agreeing to lend money to 
Scanlan to help him form Scansteel with the knowledge that such formation could have an 
adverse effect on Steelvest"). 
Numerous courts, therefore, have held that banks can undertake roles that create 
fiduciary obligations. These holdings apply a fortiori to the facts of this case because Deseret 
was not a true bank. As noted in the Statement of Facts, Deseret loaned none of its own 
money. It acted as a conduit channeling the money from the Debenture to the plaintiffs. 
(Rec 000094) From an economic standpoint, therefore, there never was a true 
debtor/creditor relationship between Deseret and plaintiffs.5 Indeed, the trial court erred 
when it held that if plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Deseret would have to sue them. 
Plaintiffs have defaulted, and the SBA has sued them, not Deseret.6 The reason for this is 
that Deseret lost no money when plaintiffs defaulted because the loan was funded by the 
Debenture, and the repayment of the Debenture was guaranteed by the SBA. It is the SBA, 
therefore, that has suffered a loss. 
To conclude, the question of whether Deserefs assistance to the Payson Group 
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty presents a question of fact for a trial. 
5
 At the loan closing, Deseret assigned the Note from plaintiffs to the SBA (Rec 000162), 
and plaintiffs' loan payments were made to Colson Services Corp., a servicing agent retained 
by the SBA. (Rec 000088, 000210) This further shows that Deseret was never truly in a 
debtor/creditor relationship with plaintiffs. 
6
 The United States of America, through its Agency, The Small Business Administration, v. Raymon Bori, 
Stephanie Bori, Jon L. Triesault, and Elizabeth A. Triesault, United States District Court, District 
of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 2:03CV446DB. The court can take judicial notice of 
this under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b). 
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D. Deseret Became A Fiduciary Because Mr. Vanchiere 
Undertook To Act As Plaintiffs* Expert Business Advisor. 
A fiduciary relationship can arise due to the specific facts of a relationship. 
Furthermore, whether such a relationship exists is "generally a question of fact." Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
It is not easy to define when such fiduciary relationships arise. The most thorough 
discussion of the subject is found in First Security Band of Utah N*A. v. Banberry Development 
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990), where the Utah Supreme court made the following 
observations: 
A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one 
individual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the 
benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise and does have 
and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary relationship implies a condition of 
superiority of one of the parties over the other. Generally, in a fiduciary 
relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is placed in the charge 
of the fiduciary, [footnote omitted] 
A confidential relationship may similarly arise whenever a continuous trust is 
reposed by one party in the skill and integrity of another. Also, as one court noted 
in 1910, 
There is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship, but it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not 
only confidence of the one in the other, but there must exist a certain 
inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of mental strength, business 
intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions, giving to 
one advantage over the other. 
Plaintiffs' evidence raises a triable issue of fact that Mr. Vanchiere's conduct created a 
fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs. As discussed in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Vanchiere 
offered to be an advisor to plaintiffs in ways far beyond the financing issues. (Rec 000301-
304) Mr. Triesault was new to the Utah area, and Mr. Vanchiere touted his extensive 
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experience in assisting start up business in the Utah area. As a result, Mr. Vanchiere was 
consulted on every phase of the operations, and his advice was central to plaintiffs7 
operations. (Rec 000301-306) 
Financing was certainly a key to the success of plaintiffs' project, and here, Mr. 
Vanchiere went beyond mere advice. He told plaintiffs they could entrust him to take all of 
the steps necessary to get them the financing they needed for their project. (Rec 000300) 
Indeed, Deseret advertises that it is a "public finance specialist." (Rec 000306) 
The trial court concluded that all of the facts concerning the relationship did not add 
up to a fiduciary relationship. With respect, the trial court could reach this conclusion only 
by weighing the facts and coming to its own conclusion. There is sufficient evidence to 
support a claim that plaintiffs placed enormous trust and confidence in defendant, and 
defendant accepted and even encouraged them to do that Whether this rose to the level of 
a fiduciary relationship must be decided after a full airing at trial of the facts concerning this 
complex relationship. 
E. The Trial Court Relied On A Non-Existent Public Policy. 
The trial court held that a "strong" public policy disfavors imposing a fiduciary duty 
on lenders because it would dampen competition. (Add 16) In reaching this conclusion, the 
court talked broadly about the chilling effect on "lenders" such a duty might have. This 
misses the essential thrust of the SBA loan program. 
Private banks are free to simultaneously lend to direct competitors. Furthermore, 
there is no need for a "policy" favoring this because if a bank does nothing more than lend 
money, it does not owe a fiduciary duty. Nothing in plaintiffs' claims would preclude private 
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banks from loaning money to competitors. It should be noted, however, that common 
sense will prevent a bank from doing what Deseret did here. What bank would loan money 
to one company, only to turn around and loan money to a competitor that will drive the first 
customer into default? The only reason this was able to happen here is because Deseret had 
none of its own money at stake and the SBA fully guaranteed the repayment of the 
Debenture. Thus, unlike a private lender, Deseret had no incentive to refuse to accept the 
Payson Group as a client even though it would cause a default under the plaintiffs' loan. 
This points to the difference between private loans and SBA loans that in turn reveals 
a very different policy concern. SBA loans are intended to nurture small businesses that 
might not otherwise have an opportunity to exist: 
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, 
assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns.... 
15 U.S.C § 631. By providing this assistance, the SBA furthers the overall health of the 
American economy because "security and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual and 
potential capacity of small business is encouraged and developed/' Id 
While some of the small businesses sponsored by the federal government will fail on 
their own, the function of the SBA loan program is to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect" 
small businesses. The loan to the Payson Group, while it assisted one small business, 
destroyed another. This is clearly inconsistent with the underlying policy of the SBA loan 
program. There is no policy served by blindly loaning to every small business that comes 
along, even when a loan to one small business destroys another SBA-backed small business. 
The true policy concern underlying this case is that the SBA loan program is designed 
to launch successful small businesses by "aiding" and "protecting" those businesses it 
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chooses to sponsor. Viewed in this light, placing the fiduciary obligation of loyalty on 
companies such as Deseret is not only consistent with the SBA's purpose, it is all but 
required to insure that the program meets its goal. No purpose is served by allowing 
Deseret to provide assistance to one dient, but then take on another client that attempts to 
destroy its first dient. Deseret should be required to treat its clients with the same loyalty 
that brokers, lawyers, accountants and all other expert advisors treat their clients. In this 
way, the SBA loan program will not blindly launch as many small business as possible, but 
will rather insure that those businesses it launches have the greatest chance of success. 
II. Count II: Intentional Interference With Prospective Economic Relations 
The three elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic 
rdations are set forth in "Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. ISOMy 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 
1982): 
in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff. 
The essence of the plaintiffs' intentional interference daim is that Deseret's actions in 
promoting the Payson Group's theater interfered with plaintiffs' existing and potential 
economic relations with its movie patrons. The claim further alleges that this was 
intentional, because the business plan for the Payson Group's theater intended to succeed by 
luring away plaintiffs' customers. 
The trial court found the second and third dements - improper means and causation 
— lacking. We will discuss the causation dement, which the trial court found lacking for all 
of plaintiffs' claims, in Section III below. We focus here, therefore, on the second dement, 
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which is whether Deseret used "improper means" in interfering with plaintiffs' economic 
relations with it customers.7 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. ISOM, 657 R2d 293, 308 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the improper means test was satisfied "where the means used 
to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law...." The court further 
explained as follows: 
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, threats or other 
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." [citation omitted] Means may also be 
improper or wrongful because they violate "an established standard of a trade 
or profession." 
Id. Plaintiffs have highlighted two sections in this quotation because the evidence shows 
that Deseret engaged in both: (1) deceit or misrepresentation, and (2) the violation of an 
established standard of a trade or profession. 
A* Deseret's Misrepresentations Or Deceit 
As shown in the Statement of Facts, the Payson Group's business plan depended 
upon taking significant numbers of plaintiffs' customers and making plaintiffs' theater "no 
longer feasible." In blunt terms, the Payson Group's business plan was dependent upon the 
destruction of plaintiffs' business. (Rec 000297) 
This raises the interesting question of why the SBA approved the Payson Group loan. 
The SBA guaranteed plaintiffs' loan and the SBA takes the most exposed position in such a 
transaction. The private bank takes the first layer of the 504 loan and receives the primary 
7
 The second element of the tortious interference claim can be fulfilled by showing either 
"improper motive" or "improper means." heigh Furniture and Carpet Company\ 657 P.2d at 
304. Plaintiffs' claim is based solely on a showing of "improper means." 
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mortgage. The certified development company takes the second layer loan, funded by the 
sale of debentures, and the SBA guarantees those debentures. Thus, if the business fails, the 
SBA will have the pay its guarantees on the debentures, and it will have the lowest priority in 
the assets of the company. If a borrower defaults on a Section 504 loan, therefore, it will be 
the SBA that suffers the loss. 
Why, then, did the SBA approve the second loan, which made the failure of the 
plaintiffs' loan almost a certainty? The answer is that the SBA never knew the Payson loan 
was going to cause the failure of plaintiffs' loan because Deseret never told the SBA. The 
business plan submitted to the SBA by Deseret and the Payson Group contains an appraisal 
that refers to taking customers from existing first-run screens in the area. (Rec 000514) The 
business plan never points out, however, that the referenced first run screens include one 
that is funded by an SBA-backed loan. Id Deseret therefore secured approval of the Payson 
Group loan by deceiving the SBA. 
The trial court acknowledged that the appraisal fails to inform the SBA that the 
Payson Group loan would destroy plaintiffs' ability to repay their loan. (Add 19) The trial 
court thought this insufficient to show deceit because the appraisal does not necessarily 
mean that the SBA was actually unaware of the relationship between the two loans. In 
effect, the trial court decided that showing that the SBA was given a deceptive document 
does not prove deception, because the SBA may have gotten the missing information about 
the relationship between the two loans from some other source. 
The trial court's reasoning was flawed. A jury would be permitted to infer from the 
appraisal alone that the SBA was deceived. The appraisal was the most logical place to 
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discuss the relationship between the two SBA-backed projects, because it specifically 
identifies the need to make other theaters "no longer feasible" in order for the Payson 
theater to succeed. Yet, it leaves out the critical fact that the theater that will "no longer be 
feasible" is an SBA-backed project This, alone, would permit a jury to conclude that it was 
more likely than not that the SBA was deceived. It is sufficient to show that the SBA was 
given a deceptive document without ruling out every other possible source of the truth. 
This is particularly true where, as here, Deseret was in the best position of all to 
demonstrate that the SBA was told the truth, had that actually happened. Just as with the 
plaintiffs, Deseret represented the Payson Group before the SBA and was therefore the 
SBA's source of information on the Payson Group's project. Thus, if the SBA had been 
told about the relationship between the two projects, the information would have come 
from Deseret Deseret, therefore could have stepped forward and provided evidence, if it 
had existed, that it told the SBA about the relationship between the projects. Tellingly, 
Deseret has never done so. Indeed, the jury would be permitted to infer from Deseret's 
silence that the SBA was never told about the relationship between the two projects. Gerard 
v. Young 432 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1967) (unfavorable inference drawn based on the failure to 
produce witness or evidence within party's control). 
The appraisal, therefore, is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact that the SBA was 
deceived. That, alone, demonstrates improper means and fulfils the second of the three 
elements of a tortious interference claim. 
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B. Violation Of An Established Standard Of A Trade Or Profession 
Plaintiffs contend as an alternative basis for their tortious interference claim that 
Deseret violated an established standard of its trade.8 Desetet is a certified development 
company, and the "standards" for this entity are set forth in the following federal regulation, 
which refers to such companies by the abbreviation "CDCf' 
Lenders, Intermediaries, CDCs, and Associate Development companies 
("ADCs") (in this section, collectively referred to as "Participants"), must act 
ethically and exhibit good character.... The following are examples of such 
unethical behavior. A Participant may not: 
(b) Have a real or apparent conflict of interest with a small business with 
which it is dealing.... 
13 C.F.R. § 120.140(b). 
The trial court agreed that this regulation sets the standard of conduct for Deseret, 
but ruled that Deseret's actions in aiding the Payson Group at the time it was still involved 
with plaintiffs' loan did not constitute a "real or apparent conflict of interest." With respect, 
if what Deseret did was not a conflict of interest, there will never be a conflict of interest. A 
"conflict of interest" means the certified development company undertakes to act in a way 
that conflicts with the interests of a current client. Deseret clearly did that, or certainly there 
are facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on this question. 
The trial court reasoned that it would be bad public policy to limit the activities of 
certified development companies by applying the conflict of interest provision to this case, 
so the trial court decided this cannot be a conflict of interest. This harkens back to the error 
we discussed earlier. The SBA's program is designed to foster successful businesses, and 
8
 It is well settled that violating the standards of a trade or profession constitutes "improper 
means." U.RC, Inc. v. R.0^4. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 957 (Utah App. 1999). 
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public policy does and should preclude certified development companies from taking on one 
client, only to then take on a second client that destroys the business of the first client. If 
one views the role of the certified development company as developing successful small 
business, the regulatory conflict of interest provision makes eminent sense. 
In plaintiffs' view, Deseret's actions should be deemed a conflict of interest as a 
matter of law. However, at a minimum, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Deseret 
had a conflict of interest, and thereby used "improper means" by violating an industry or 
professional standard as set by the federal government. 
III. The Evidence Presented A Triable Issue Of Fact On Causation 
The trial court ruled that plaintiffs lacked any admissible evidence that Deseret's 
assistance to the Payson Group caused plaintiffs' harm. There is, however, abundant 
evidence that (a) the opening of the Payson theater caused plaintiffs' theater to fail, and (b) 
that the Payson theater could never have opened without Deseret's assistance. This 
evidence was more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on causation. 
A. There Is Abundant Evidence That The Opening Of The 
Payson Theater Caused The Demise Of Plaintiffs' Theater. 
The evidence on this point was not only sufficient, it was overwhelming: 
• Comparing before and after revenues, for the 12 months prior to Payson 
theater's opening, plaintiffs' revenues were approximately $2 million, but just $1.4 million for 
the 12 months after the new theater opened. (Rec 000520) 
• Comparing attendance for comparable months before and after, in May 1999 
the attendance at plaintiffs' theater was 42,813, in May 2000 attendance was 21,141. In June 
1999 attendance was 49,058, in June 2000,18,856. In July 1999 attendance was 43,080, but 
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in July 2000 attendance was 28,712. (Rec 000520) For the entire year before the Payson 
theater opened plaintiffs' attendance was approximately 336,722 (Rec 000520), but only 
231,717 in the year after. 
• Concession revenues, a key measure of a theater's success, were approximately 
$606,099.60 before the Payson theater opened (Rec 000520}, but only $417,090.60 in the 
following year. (Rec 000520) 
• In response to the suggestion that plaintiffs' theater just had bad luck with the 
movies it picked after the Payson theater opened, consider the Star Wars data. In May 1999, 
Star Wars Episode I came out. Plaintiffs' theater had 13,520 customers and made 
$55,115.29 admissions in the first week of the movie. In post-Payson May 2002, Star Wars 
Episode II came out and plaintiffs' theater had just 6,734 customers and made only 
$26,188.71 in admissions in the first week of the movie. (Rec 000519-520) 
• In the aggregate, in the year after the Payson theater opened, plaintiffs' theater 
lost over 100,000 people in attendance, over $600,000 in gross revenues and over $189,000 
in gross concession sales. (Rec 000520) 
The trial court ruled that all of this might have been due to bad management, market 
factors or general economic conditions. (Add 28) This suggests, however, that plaintiffs 
have to rule out every other possible cause of their post-Payson theater decline in order to 
raise a triable issue of fact. This ovets^tps the burden on plaintiffs. The evidence cited 
above is more than sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. 
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The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs needed an expert witness on causation 
because this issue was "not within the common knowledge and expertise of the layman." 
(Add 26) There is no legal basis for imposing such a requirement 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
(emphasis added) There is nothing in this or any other rule of evidence that requires that 
expert testimony be used. 
Utah courts have developed a very limited exception to this in malpractice cases: 
[B]efore the plaintiff can prevail in a medical malpractice action, he must establish 
both the standard of care required of the defendant as a practicing physician in the 
community and the defendants failure to employ that standard. In the majority of 
medical malpractice cases the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish 
this standard of care. Expert testimony is required because the nature of the 
profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and 
understanding of the average citizen. 
Nixdotfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Utah 1980.) 
There are exceptions to this rule even in malpractice cases. Id. (No expert testimony 
needed to prove loss of a needle during surgery was negligent.) More critically, however, this 
rule has never been extended outside the malpractice arena to create other categories of 
cases where expert testimony is required. Indeed, in the only case cited by the trial court, 
Shreiterv. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah App. 1994), the question was whether 
the plaintiff had to present expert testimony on the standard of care owed by the operator of 
a retiree apartment building who had failed to install a sprinkler system. Although the court 
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noted that expert testimony is sometimes needed "where the average person has little 
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, as in cases involving 
medical doctors, architects, and engineers," the court concluded that expert testimony was 
not required in that case because juries could determine what was reasonable for the 
operator of retiree housing. Id 
Expert testimony has never been required in business cases involving economic 
issues. For example, in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), the plaintiff 
claimed that a fire destroyed some it its equipment and caused it to lose profitable contracts. 
Plaintiffs evidence supporting its lost profit claim was the testimony of an employee about 
the jobs they lost and the value of those contracts. The trial court granted a directed verdict 
for the defendant, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding the testimony of the 
employee was sufficient to place the lost profits issue before the jury. 
Plaintiffs' evidence on causation consists of showing the severe drop in attendance, 
sales and other indicators that occurred direcdy after the Payson theater opened. A jury can 
surely understand these facts. Deseret is welcome to attack this evidence in any way it 
chooses, even through expert testimony, but there is no basis for finding that causation can 
only be proven with expert testimony. The finding that expert testimony is required would 
appear to be another reflection of the trial court's view that plaintiffs' numerical evidence is 
insufficient. The trial court thought that the only way to prove causation would be to have 
an expert in the movie business perform some comprehensive (and expensive) analysis on 
the overall market place, and through this analysis rule out every other possible cause of the 
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cause of the demise of plaintiffs' theater. While such evidence is certainly possible, there is 
no legal basis for requiring such evidence. 
B. The Payson Theater Would Never Have 
Opened Without Deseret's Assistance. 
The trial court held, in the alternative, that even if the Payson theater's opening 
caused the demise of plaintiffs' theater, Deseret's actions in obtaining financing for the 
Payson theater were too remotely related to the failure of plaintiffs' theater to be deemed the 
cause. (Add 27,28) This finding is based on both incorrect legal and factual assumptions. 
Factually, there are two undisputed facts that show the necessary link. First, the 
Payson theater would not have opened without an SBA-backed loan. This fact is 
indisputable because the SBA cannot provide assistance unless no other financing is 
available. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101. 
Second, at the relevant time, Deseret was the only company providing assistance in 
obtaining SBA-backed loans in Utah. (Rec 000459) Thus, the jury can find that the Payson 
theater would never have opened without Deseret's assistance. 
Plaintiffs need to prove that the loan was a "proximate cause" of their loss: 
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence[ ] 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury, [citation omitted] "(T]he 
issue of proximate cause should be taken from the jury only where: (1) there is no 
evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, 
or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived 
from the evidence on proximate causation." 
Rase v. Prow City, 67 P.3d 1017,1024-25 (Utah App. 2000). 
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Under this standard, plaintiffs must present evidence from which a jury could 
conclude that the loan "set in operation" events that caused plaintiffs' injury. The loan, 
which only Deseret could secure, meets this test. 
The trial court also ruled that factors such as "market forces, business judgment and 
quality of movies" were "efficient intervening causes." (Add 28) The trial court seemed to 
be ruling that, even if the loan was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, other factors such 
as market conditions or management ability were intervening causes that broke the line of 
causation. This, however, was pure speculation. No evidence was presented that these 
other factors played any role in the demise of plaintiffs' theater. The trial court therefore 
found that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact on causation because they did not rule out 
all other possible causes of their injuries. There is no legal basis for such a burden. 
The burden on a defendant arguing that there is an intervening cause is considerable. 
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein (^Yielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996), for example, the 
plaintiff sued a law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that if the firm had acted 
appropriately, the plaintiff would have gotten different financing, which would have caused a 
business transaction to turn out much more favorably. The trial court entered summary 
judgment holding in part that the plaintiff had used a lawyer other than the defendant, and 
that the advice of that other lawyer was an intervening cause. The appellate court reversed, 
ruling that issue should have been resolved at trial. 
In the case at bar, there is no dispute but that plaintiffs' business declined 
immediately after the Payson theater opened. The trial court found that this decline was due 
to some other intervening cause as a matter of law, even though no evidence of any other 
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cause was presented. The question of whether there was an intervening cause should have 
been left for trial, and could not properly provide a basis for summary judgment 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this brief, plaintiffs-appellants respectfully request that the 
Court reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the Count I 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Count II intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations claim and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and 
remand the case for trial on those claims. 
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ADDENDUM 
FILED 
Fourth JudlciaJ Distnci Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JON and ELIZABETH TRTESAULT, 
RAYMON and STEPHANIE BORI 
individuals, IMAGINATION THEATERS, 
INC , a corporation, and IMAGINATION 
THEATERS HOLDING, L L C a limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE GREATER SALT LAKE BUSINESS 
DISTRICT, a Utah corporation, doing 
business as DESERET CDC, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case #020401399 
Judge Fred D Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Defendant' ^ Motionfor Summary Judgment (Causation; Emotional Distress). The Court, having 
reviewed the parties' respective pleadings and being folly advised in the premises, hereby issues the 
following: 
RULING 
BACKGROUND 
This case arises from the involvement of the Defendants, a certified development 
company (CDC), and the duty, if any, such company owes to small businesses that it assists in 
obtaining federally guaranteed loans through the 504 SBA loan program Plaintiffs obtained an 
SBA loan with Defendant's assistance in 1998 in order to build a movie theater in Spanish Fork, 
Utah, named Spanish 8 Theater, Subsequently, Defendant aided another business, Payson 
Theater, in obtaining an SBA loan which enabled it to construct a competing movie theater in 
Payson, Utah Plaintiffs' business subsequently failed, which failui e Plaintiffs attribute to 
competition from Payson Theater Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duty, 
(2) intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and (3) violation of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing Plaintiffs also allege intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as part of each cause of action The Defendant has denied ary wrongdoing, claiming that 
it owed no fiduciary duty toward Plaintiff and did not commit the alleged torts. 
The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on December 31, 2002 contending 
that it owed no fiduciary duty toward Plaintiffs and, therefore, could not breach such a duty. 
Defendant also asserted that it could not have interfered with Plaintiffs5 economic relations as a 
matter of law because there were no facts to establish either an improper purpose or improper 
means necessary to establish such a tort. The Defendant also argued that it did not violate the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because each party received what it bargained for in the 
loan contract negotiations. The Plaintiffs responded alleging that Defendant was Plaintiffs' agent 
and owed a corresponding duty because of that agency and that Defendant's actions constituted a 
special relationship, by which it owed a duty implied by law. Plaintiffs also argued that the grant 
of the loan to Payson Theater without informing the SBA of its potential harmful effect upon 
Plaintiffs' business constituted an intentional interference with Plaintiffs' economic relations and 
was in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
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On June 17, 2003 Judge Claudia Laycock heard oral arguments on Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment, which motion she denied, rulmg that factual issues existed that precluded 
summary judgment. On January 1, 2004 Judge Fred Howard rotated into the fifth division and 
assumed assignment over the present case The Defendant subsequently filed a second motion for 
summary judgment on causation and emotional distress which w7as heard by the Court on April 
13, 2004. The Court denied summary judgment on the issue of causation and granted summary 
judgment on the claim for emotional distress, but subsequently reversed it's ruling on emotional 
distress and denied summary judgment on that issue as well 
The case was set for trial but upon review of Defendant's trial memorandum the Court 
informed the parties that it wished to revisit all of the issues previously raised in the preceding 
summary judgment motions. The Court vacated the previous rulings and invited the parties to 
supplement their briefing on the issues, which the parties declined instead choosing to rest upon 
their earlier submitted pleadings. The trial date was then stricken and oral arguments were 
presented to the Court on June 8, 2004, whereupon the Court took the matter under advisement. 
With respect to the standard governing summary judgment, the Court notes that 
summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 
(Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court has stressed that the rules regarding summary judgment 
"should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect the prompt administration of 
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justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where no triable issue of fact is 
disclosed " Nat 'I American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Ire, 403 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah 
1965) Further, the purpose of a motion for summary judgment "is to provide a means of 
searching out the undisputed facts" to determine if the matter can be resolved "as a matter of 
law," thereby saving both the court and the parties the "time, trouble, and expense of a trial." Rich 
v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Utah 1976). 
FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Before this case may be presented to the jury on the question of any breach of duty, this 
Court must determine whether, in light of the relevant facts, the Defendant owed a duty to the 
Plaintiff. It is the province of the Court to determine as a matter of law the nature and extent, if 
any, of the duty Defendant owed to Plaintiffs. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 
1986); Hale v. Beckstead, 74 P.3d 628 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 
969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998). Utah appellate courts have established two types of fiduciary 
relationships. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court recognized those relationships that are: 
(1) created by contract such as principal and agent, attorney and client, and trustee and 
cestui que trust, for example, and those created by formal legal proceedings such as 
guardian and/or conservator and ward, and executor or administrator of an estate, 
among others and (2) those implied in law due to the factual situation surrounding the 
involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to each other and to the 
questioned transactions. 
First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990). 
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In this case, Plaintiffs have advanced two theories to establish a fiduciary duty First, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was Plaintiffs3 agent, and as such, owed a fiduciary duty of 
'loyalty' to Plaintiffs not to do anything that might harm their business Alternatively, Plaintiffs 
argue that the relationship between the parties, including Defendant's advice and counsel to 
Plaintiffs, created a relationship by which Defendant became an implied in law fiduciary to 
Plaintiffs. The Court will consider each theory in turn. 
A. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the elements of 'agency5 to support 
their assertion that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant was their agent in the procurement of an SB A 
504 loan and giving of financial and business advice to Plaintiffs after the loan and, therefore, 
owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs under a theory of agency Defendant defends that it was never 
an agent for Plaintiffs. Among other things, Defendant refers the Court to the SBA's standard 
operating procedure, which specifically states, "neither the development company nor its 
employees is an agent for a 504 loan application in which the CDC is involved." SOP-10(4)(E) 
Subpart A, chapter 6, 13 Regulations Regarding Agents(d). The SBA's standard operating 
procedure, while possessing the air of authority, is neither a congressional nor administrative 
regulation. As such, it is merely the SBA's interpretation of the relationship between a CDC and 
prospective borrower and has no real authority upon the parties or the courts. Therefore, the 
Court must look to the parties, their relationship, and general agency principles to determine if an 
agency relationship existed. 
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In order to establish that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that their relationship satisfies basic agency principles The Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 1 (1958) defines agency as uthe fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation 
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act." See also Mecham v. Consolidated Oil & 
Transportation, Inc., 53 P.3d 479, 483 (Utah Ct App. 2002) ("agency is 'the fiduciary relation 
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to anc ther that the other shall act 
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act'5') (quoting Wardley 
Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)); Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 
970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998) (a[t]o be an agent, a person must be authorized by another to 
'act on his behalf and subject to his control5") (quoting Restatement ^Second) of Agency § 1 
(1958)). 
The Plaintiffs have produced evidence demonstrating that they authorized Defendant to 
act on their behalf in obtaining an SB A loan. Plaintiffs were SB A loan applicants who relied upon 
Defendant to assist them in preparing their application materials and were required to work with 
and to conform to Defendant's requirements in order to obtain SB A approval. The Plaintiffs 
placed their trust and confidence in Defendant, who was their voice with the SB A, and without 
Defendant's assistance, Plaintiffs likely would not have obtained the SB A loan. 
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Plaintiffs have not, however, presented any evidence that Defendant was subject to 
Plaintiffs' control, nor that Defendant consented to be under Plaintiffs' control. To the contrary, 
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendant directed Plaintiffs as to how to prepare their 
SBA loan application and have alleged that Defendant directed Plaintiffs on how to conduct their 
business Nowhere in their pleadings do Plaintiffs submit evidence that Defendant was subject to 
Plaintiffs' control. Rather, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly emphasized the direction and control 
Defendant allegedly had over Plaintiffs. This element of agency law is not simply to be glossed 
over. "It is the element of continuous subjection to the will of the principal which distinguishes the 
agent from other fiduciaries and the agency agreement from other agreements." Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. b (1958). 
Plaintiffs refer to 13 C.F.R.§ 103.1(a) and (b) (1996) in support of their assertion that 
Defendant was Plaintiffs' agent. This regulation defines an agent as: 
... an authorized representative, including an attorney, accountant, consultant, 
packager, lender service provider, or any other person representing an applicant or 
participant by conducting business with SBA. 
(b) The term conduct business with SBA means: 
(1) Preparing or submitting on behalf of an applicant an application for financial 
assistance of any kind... 
Plaintiffs contend the above regulation establishes Defendant as Plaintiffs5 agent. 
Plaintiffs are in error. This regulation simply defines what it means to be an agent, but does not 
establish Defendant as Plaintiffs' agent, nor does it obviate the need for traditional agency law 
analysis. If Plaintiffs had hired an attorney, accountant, consultant, etc. to represent them in their 
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dealings with the SBA, this regulation would establish that individual as an agent who could do 
business with the SBA This regulation does not, however, confirm agency status upon Defendant 
simply because Defendant assisted Plaintiffs in preparing theii loan application Further, the 
SBA's interpretation of this regulation, while not binding, is certainly illustrative of the intent 
behind this regulation See SOP-10(4)(E) Subpart A, chapter 6, 13 Regulations Regarding 
Agents(d), "neither the development company nor its employees is an agent for a 504 loan 
application in which the CDC is involved " 
A certified development company is required by the SBA to assist loan applicants to 
ensure that the applicants meet certain qualifications in order to protect the SBA. Thus, the 
relationship between the Defendant and Plaintiffs is more akin to that of an intermediary than that 
of agent/principal, i e someone who wields power in the name of anDther but is not considered an 
agent under agency law principles. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. g (1958) 
addresses such individuals "who bind others, or even act in the name of others, but do so for their 
own purposes." The Restatement specifically refers to the relationship between a mortgagor and 
mortgagee1 to illustrate this principle that a person may act in the name of another without 
becoming an agent, and concluded that "[s]uch a power is not an agency power and the holder of 
one is not an agent of the one who created it." Id Such is the case here Defendant was 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the relationship 
between mortgagor and mortgagee is presumptively "not of a 
fiduciary character.1 First Sec. Bank of Utah at 1332. 
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empowered to act in Plaintiffs' name in its communication with the SB A, but did so for its own 
purpose - to foster economic growth in the community by assisting small businesses to obtain 
SB A loans The Defendant possessed power to act on Plaintiffs' behalf in the facilitating and 
servicing of the SB A loan, such as "collecting] money due on the contract," id, but was not 
under the control of the Plaintiffs and, therefore, not an c agent' under a legal agency analysis 
In conclusion, without some evidence from Plaintiffs that they did in fact exercise some 
degree of control over Defendant and that Defendant consented to the control, this Court cannot 
conclude that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent. Accordingly, without an agency relationship, 
Defendant did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty and could, therefore, assist Payson Theater in 
obtaining an SB A loan. 
B. The limited scope and purpose of Defendant's agency, assuming such an 
agency existed, prevented Defendant from having a fiduciary duty toward 
Plaintiffs. 
Even should the Plaintiffs be able to produce evidence that Plaintiffs exercised some 
degree of control over Defendant sufficient to establish an agency relationship, the Court cannot 
conclude that the relationship between the parties was a fiduciary relationship due to the fact that 
"an agent is a fiduciary with respect to the matters within the scope of the agency" only. 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d Agency § 205 (2004). In other words, "an agent is not in a fiduciary relationship to the 
principal in matters in which the agent is not employed unless the nature of the agency is such as 
to create a confidential relationship in all maters " Id. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 
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cmt. d (1958) states, an "agent is not, as such, in a fiduciary relation with the principal as to 
matters in which he is not employed " See also BcmcoklahomaMorlg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co.^ 
194 F.3d 1089, 1104 (10th Cir.1999) ("agency is characterized by ... a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to matters within the scope of the agency") (emphasis added), Taylor v. Hamden Hall 
School, 182 A.2d 615, 618 (Conn. 1962) ("[h]e is not in a fiduciary relation to his principal, 
however, in matters in which he is not employed1'). The facts of this case, even when considered 
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, demonstrate that Defendant, assuming an agency 
relationship existed, was an agent for the limited purpose of obtaining and servicing the SB A loan 
for Plaintiffs. Defendant was not a director or officer of Plaintiffs' business, did not possess 
authority to bind Plaintiffs to contracts with third parties, did not share in the risks or rewards of 
the theater, and was not directly compensated by Plaintiffs for any suggestions given to Plaintiffs. 
Thus, the facts submitted by Plaintiffs clearly establish that, urder agency law, Defendant 
did not have a confidential relationship in all matters, and as such, could only be considered an 
agent for the limited purpose of obtaining and servicing the SB A loan. This limited duty cannot 
reasonably be expanded to include a fiduciary duty of'loyalty' not to do anything that might harm 
Plaintiffs' business interests. To accept Plaintiffs' argument would mean that anyone who 
performs a service for another now has a duty to that individual or business entity similar to that 
possessed by directors and officers of a corporation, only this duty would be imposed without 
granting the rights and privileges that accompany directors and officers. Such logic would impose 
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the rigorous responsibilities of directors and officers upon all agents, regardless of the agent's 
authority within the business, without the corresponding rights and rewards Such a conclusion is 
not warranted by the law or the facts of this case 
In addition, once the loan was made, Defendant became Plaintiffs' lender via contract. 
Contractually, Plaintiffs were obligated to Defendant to repay the loan. Should Plaintiffs default 
on the loan, Defendant would be legally entitled to sue them for breach of contract. In short, 
Defendant and Plaintiffs were arms-length parties to a contract, which by its nature, precluded 
Defendant from having a duty of'loyalty' for Plaintiffs. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 
P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996) ("when the parties deal'at arm's length' or in an adversarial 
relationship, no fiduciary relationship can be said to exist") (emphasis added). It would be 
inconsistent for Defendant to pursue its lawdnl remedy in court should Plaintiffs default and 
simultaneously observe a duty of'loyalty' toward Plaintiffs. Therefore, under an agency law 
analysis, Defendant did not possess a fiduciary duty as advocated by Plaintiffs, and could, 
therefore, assist other businesses such as Payson Theater in obtaining an SBA loan. 
C. Defendant was not an implied in law fiduciary for Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' second theory for imposing a duty upon Defendant is that Defendant became an 
implied in law fiduciary "due to the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the 
relationship of the parties to each other." First Sec. Bank o/Utah,786 P.2d at 1332. To become 
an implied in law fiduciary several principles must be considered, namely (1) "A fiduciary 
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relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one individual in another," (2) a 
"fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another," (3) a "fiduciary is in 
a position to have and exercise and does have and exercise influence over another; (4) a "fiduciary 
relationship implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties o/er the other;" and (5) 
generally speaking, "in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest, or authority of the other is 
placed in the charge of the fiduciary." Id. at 1333. In First Sec. Bank of Utah, the court also 
noted that a confidential relationship may be estabhshed when one party places continuous trust in 
the skill and integrity of another and that there exists "a certain inequality, dependence, weakness 
of age, of mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other 
conditions, giving to one advantage over the other. Id.2 
2Plaintiffs cite several cases where different courts found various lending institutions to 
have created a fiduciary duty with their respective borrowers through the actions of bank/lender 
employees. However, while it is true that a fiduciary duty may arise between a lender and its 
borrower through special factual circumstances, all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs are inapposite 
to the case at hand. In all of the cited cases, the courts found that specific, special facts existed to 
warrant finding that a special relationship and corresponding duty existed. For instance, in the 
cases cited by Plaintiffs the courts find one of the following facts to be present: (1) the lender 
claimed ownership in the borrower's property, (2) the lender had a financial interest in property 
purchased by borrower, (3) the lender induced the borrower to sell and unfairly purchased the 
borrower's property, (4) the lender made affirmative false representations and induced borrower 
to purchase property the lender had a financial interest in, or (5) the lender knowingly assisted a 
client in breaching the client's fiduciary duties the client owed to his former corporation as a 
director of that corporation. Plaintiffs have not alleged any of these factual settings, and as such, 
the Court observes that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the authorities cited by 
Plaintiffs. SeeMancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732 (Cclo. 1991); Capital Bank v. 
MVB Co., 644 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1994), Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); 
Security Pacific National Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 927 (Cal Ct. App. 1989); 
Steelvest, Inc. v. ScansteelSendee Ctr. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Kent. 1991). 
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Applying the facts of this case to the law, it is clear that Defendant did not possess a 
fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiffs In their pleadings, Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the 
fact that Defendant advised and assisted Plaintiffs in procuring the SB A loan While it is true that 
Defendant did have a responsibility to assist Plaintiffs in the loan application and approval 
process, and for purposes of the motions, presumably possessed superior knowledge and skill to 
advise Plaintiffs on how to obtain an SB A loan, the Defendant did in fact obtain the loan for the 
Plaintiffs, thereby fulfilling its obligation Had the Defendant thereafter ceased to advise Plaintiffs, 
there would be no question that a fiduciary relationship did not exist. Thus, the real issue concerns 
the relationship between the parties in light of their history and the advice given to the Plaintiffs 
post-loan. 
The Plaintiffs recite facts in support of their assertion that Defendant owed Plaintiffs a 
fiduciary duty. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Mr. Vanchiere, Defendant's employee, 
visited the theater twice per month, advised Plaintiffs regarding the theater's operation including 
what concessions to sell and what movies to show, was given confidential financial information 
concerning the theater, and assisted the Plaintiffs in obtaining SBA approval to lease portions of 
the theater's parking lot to a neighboring business. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p 14-15. Though Plaintiffs have also alleged that 
Defendant "made sure plaintiffs never personally took any amount of money from the theater until 
the theater became profitable/' they have failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate how 
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Defendant amade sure " Id Absent such record, Plaintiffs have failed to establish such assertion as 
a 'fact' 
While it is clear from the facts that Plaintiffs trusted Defendant, taken together, these facts 
cannot establish the requirements for a fiduciary as mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in First 
Sec. Bank of Utah, 786 P.2d at 1332. First, the recited facts do not demonstrate that Defendant 
had a duty to act primarily for the benefit of Plaintiffs, nor that the Defendant was ever placed in 
charge of Plaintiffs5 property or interests. Defendant was not a partrer or party to a joint venture 
business with the Plaintiffs, nor did Defendant share in the risks or rewards of the theater. In 
addition, Defendant never possessed any authority to compel Plaintiffs to act on any of its 
suggestions. There is no evidence suggesting that Defendant utilized any of the theater's 
confidential financial information for any purpose let alone to the Plaintiffs' detriment.3 Thus, the 
fact that Defendant possessed confidential financial information is immaterial. Also, the fact that 
Plaintiffs were later required to obtain SB A approval for the parking lot lease through Defendant 
does not establish a fiduciary duty. The terms of the contract required Plaintiffs to obtain SB A 
approval in order to ensure that the collateral for the SBA loan remained viable. Defendant was 
simply acting in accordance with the contract in servicing the loan for the Plaintiffs. Defendant 
3The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a bank did 
not possess a fiduciary duty toward a client who divulged 
confidential information to the bank when the bank loaned money 
to the client's competibor knowing that the competitor would use 
the money to purchase controlling stock in the client's 
corporation. Washington Steel, Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 
(3r* Cir. 1979) . 
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was not engaging in behavior outside the contract that would give rise to a special relationship 
and corresponding duty 
Simply put, all of the facts of this case considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs 
demonstrate that Plaintiffs were not dependent on the Defendant in the operation of their 
business, nor were the Plaintiffs inferior to Defendant in weakness of age, mental strength, 
business intelligence, or knowledge, that would give Defendant an advantage over the Plaintiffs. 
Any arguable duty possessed by Defendant was created by its behavior, and is, therefore, also 
limited by that behavior. If Defendant possessed any duty beyond obtaining an SBA loan for 
Plaintiffs, it was a duty to continue to give advice to the best of its knowledge concerning the 
operation of the theater. Plaintiffs argue that by virtue of the parties' relationship, Defendant had a 
duty of'loyalty' to Plaintiffs not to do anything that would injure Plaintiffs' business, or a duty 
similar to that possessed by directors and officers of a corporation. The Court cannot conclude 
that such a duty was created by Defendant's limited actions. Defendant was not a director, 
officer, or owner of Plaintiffs' business, did not share in the risks or rewards of the business, and 
possessed no authority to compel the Plaintiffs to follow any of its suggestions. In short, 
Defendant was simply a facilitator for obtaining an SBA loan whose employee, Mr. Vanchiere, 
developed an amicable relationship with Plaintiffs and who gave gratuitous advice, if not mere 
suggestions, to Plaintiffs after the SBA loan was obtained. Such behavior by Defendant cannot as 
a matter of law confer a fiduciary duty upon Defendant. 
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D. Public policy disfavors conferring fiduciary duties upon lenders. 
In addition to the proceeding, public policy strongly opposes conferring any such duty 
The policy of the United States government favors competition "Only through full and free 
competition can free markets, free entry into business and opportunities for the expression and 
growth of personal initiative and individual judgment be assured." 15 U.S C.S. § 631(a) (1997). 
The purpose of a certified development company, (CDC), is to develop communities by assisting 
small businesses in obtaining capital loans The logic advanced by Plaintiffs would preclude a 
CDC from loaning money to any business that might compete with an existing business that 
previously obtained SBA funding through the CDC. Such logic is inapposite to the concept of 
free markets and commercial competition, and would essentially eviscerate a CDC's ability to 
provide funding. 
If Plaintiffs5 argument were accepted, any business could limit, if not eliminate, 
competition simply by obtaining a loan before its competitors. Lenders would be limited in 
funding types of businesses. Arguments over the "type of business," its scope and breadth, would 
inevitably arise and burden lenders to assess if a potential loan was an inappropriate aid to a 
competitor. For example, would Defendant be precluded from lending to a candy store near 
Plaintiffs' theater since Plaintiffs sell candy at the theater and a large percentage of Plaintiffs' 
revenue comes from concession sales? Would lending to a video rental store, cable, or satellite 
industry, which are presumably businesses competitive to a theater, be prohibited? 
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Plaintiffs' competition argument creates a host of problems concerning the availability of 
funding and economic development that would undoubtedly hinder rather than foster the growth 
of business While it may be true that competition may cause some of the businesses to which 
SBA has loaned funds to go out of business, it is the province of Congress to determine the 
regulations and procedures by which such funding shall be available 
For these reasons, and for those set forth in Defendant's memoranda, this Court concludes 
the Defendant owed no fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs that would prevent Defendant from giving a 
loan to any business that competed with Plaintiffs Specifically, the Court finds as a matter of law 
that Defendant did not possess a fiduciary duty toward Plaintiffs that prevented Defendant from 
giving a loan to Payson Theater and, accordingly, dismisses Plaintiffs5 first cause of action 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
In order to recover for common-law tort of intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. ISOM, 657 P,2d 
293, 304 (Utah 1982) 
The Plaintiffs contend the first element of interference with economic relations is satisfied 
by the fact that Defendant facilitated the SBA loan for Payson Theater when it 'knew5 such loan 
would destroy Plaintiffs' business The Court declines to address this issue of whether Defendant 
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intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' business, instead finding that the analysis on the second 
and third elements of economic interference to be dispositive 
Plaintiffs rest their argument for the second element of interference with economic 
relations upon 'improper means,5 which may be established by showing 'Violence, threats or 
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigatisn, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood." Id. at 308 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant committed deceit or 
misrepresentation by failing to inform the SBA of the alleged harmful effect the Payson Theater 
competition could have upon Plaintiffs' business where the Plaintiffs' business was also funded by 
the SBA Improper means may also be established through a violation of "an established standard 
of a trade or profession," id., which Plaintiffs contend occurred when Defendant allegedly 
violated a federal regulation prohibiting a "conflict of interest with a small business with which it 
is dealing." 13 C.F.R. § 120.140(b) (2003). 
Plaintiffs contend that deceit or misrepresentation is demons:rated by the fact that 
Defendant, for "pure profit," assisted the Payson Theater in obtaining an SBA loan without 
informing the SBA of the 'fact' that the loan to Payson Theater would result in the "destruction of 
plaintiffs' business," which was funded by the SBA. Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment p. 29-30. Plaintiffs argue the SBA did not know that 
Payson Theater would compete with and possibly drive Plaintiffs' theater out of business and that 
the SBA would not have authorized the Payson Theater loan had it been advised of such facts. 
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There aie several flaws to Plaintiffs' argument First, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence 
supporting their assertion that Defendant loaned money to Payson Theater because of a profit 
motive Plaintiffs have simply assumed that because Defendant would receive no fee from the 
SB A if the loan to Payson Theater was not approved that Defendant must have been operating 
with a self-interested motive The Court notes that the Defendant is a non-profit organization and 
Plaintiffs have failed to produce affidavits or other record showing a profit motive, such as 
Defendant needing fees to continue its operation, or of an employee, such as Mr Vanchiere, 
requiring such fees to maintain his employment 
More importantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to frame the non-disclosure of the alleged 
effect of the Payson Theater loan on Plaintiffs in terms of SBA knowledge Plaintiffs assume that 
the SBA was unaware that arguably the Payson Theater's business plan would take 'market share' 
of theater patrons from Plaintiffs' theater, thereby reducing revenues and potentially cause 
Plaintiffs to default on their loan obligations Plaintiffs contend that such non-disclosure 
constitutes 'deceit or misrepresentation5 and was, therefore, an improper means However, the 
only record produced by Plaintiffs in support of this allegation is an appraisal that states the 
Payson Theater should succeed despite the fact that there are several theaters in the area because 
the Payson Theater will be new and, therefore, will likely attract more than its 'fair share5 of the 
market and make the older theaters "no longer feasible ,5 Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G, A Complete Appraisal, p 31 The 
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appraisal does specifically mention Plaintiffs' business, Spanish 8 Theater, but not the fact that 
Spanish 8 Theater was funded by an SB A loan Id 
Deceit is defined as "the act or practice of deceiving as by falsification, concealment, or 
cheating " Webster's Third'New International Dictionary (1993) To show these elements, 
Plaintiffs must produce some evidence that the Defendant falsified or concealed information from 
the SBA or somehow cheated the SBA Plaintiffs have produced nc such evidence to support 
such an assertion of deceit There is no record by an appropriate SEA agent stating that it was 
unaware of the competing nature of the loans and that the SBA would not have awarded the 
Payson Theater loan with such knowledge. The SBA might have been aware of both loans and 
the competing nature of those loans or the SBA may have been unpersuaded by the appraisal's 
claim that Payson Theater would drive other theaters out of business The record is silent as to 
whether the SBA was ignorant of those facts Plaintiffs contend were undisclosed The only Tact5 
before the Court is the above mentioned appraisal, which, by itself, is insufficient to establish an 
allegation of deceit There is not, therefore, a material fact in dispute over whether the SBA was 
deceived since the facts before this Court, which are not disputed, cannot establish the elements of 
deceit or misrepresentation. 
Regarding Plaintiffs' contention that Defendant violated an established standard of a trade 
or profession, such arguments also fail The Plaintiffs present no evidence to support this assertion 
other than the fact that Defendant assisted Payson Theater in obtaining SBA financing Plaintiffs 
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argue with emphasis thai this fact alone demonstrates a violation because the competing loan was 
in conflict with Plaintiffs' interests and federal regulations prohibit a CDC from having a "conflict 
of interest with a small business with which it is dealing " 13 C.F.R § 120 140(b) (2003). 
Plaintiffs interpret this regulation as meaning a CDC cannot grant a loan to any business that may 
compete with a business that has already obtained SBA financing. However, the regulation 
contains no such language It simply prohibits conflicts of interest but does not define what 
constitutes a conflict of interest Again, public policy cuts against Plaintiffs' argument that 
Defendant has a conflict of interest when it assists competing businesses to obtain loans because 
competition fosters development, and the very purpose for Defendant's existence is to develop 
communities by assisting small businesses in obtaining loans. Having no fiduciary duty, or at the 
minimum a clearly defined regulation barring the granting of competing loans, it cannot be said 
that Defendant had a conflict of interest when it assisted Payson Theater in obtaining SBA 
financing. 
In addition, Plaintiffs cannot meet the third element of interference with economic 
relations: causation. The Plaintiffs have assumed that the Defendant's loan to Payson Theater 
caused Plaintiffs' business to fail. However, while Plaintiffs make many assertions that said loan 
caused their business to fail, the Court disagrees with such arguments. The Plaintiffs have not 
produced sufficient evidentiary facts to allow a jury to conclude, without speculation, that the 
giving of the loan to Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' business to fail. As will be discussed under 
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the causation section of this Ruling, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, cannot establish that the 
Defendant caused Plaintiffs' business to fail by assisting Payson Theater in obtaining an SB A loan 
In conclusion, the facts as recited by Plaintiffs do not support an act of deceit or 
misrepresentation or a violation of an established standard of a trade or profession sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment Also, Plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law meet the third element 
required to establish economic interference, which is to demonstrate that Defendant's actions 
caused Plaintiffs' injury For these reasons, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Defendant 
did not intentionally interfere with Plaintiffs' prospective economic relations and, therefore, 
dismisses Plaintiffs' second cause of action. 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing entitles each party to a contract the right to 
enjoy the benefits of the contract. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 
P 2d 194 (Utah 1991). "To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a 
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations 
of the other party ... [t]he purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be 
determined by considering the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct 
of the parties." itf at 200. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
the contract by granting a loan to a competitor, thereby undermining Plaintiffs' business The 
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Plaintiffs have again failed to marshal sufficient evidentiary facts to defeat summary judgment 
Plaintiffs have failed to show any evidence that Defendant violated Plaintiffs' reasonable 
expectations to enjoy the fruits of the contract Plaintiffs contend there is a disputed material fact 
by virtue of Defendant allegedly violating Plaintiffs' reasonable expectation "that they would be 
able to pay off the loan without DCDC affirmatively sabotaging their business " Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment \> 32 Defendant 
does not dispute that Plaintiff did in fact possess such a reasonable expectation, however, the 
Court concludes that Plaintiffs' recited facts do not support the assertion that Defendant did in 
fact sabotage Plaintiffs' business Again, Plaintiffs rely upon the argument that Defendant's 
assistance to Payson Theater is evidence per se of Defendant damaging Plaintiffs' business 
Plaintiffs' assumption and subsequent arguments are unsupported by the facts or law, however 
The Court has previously discussed the fact that Defendant did not possess a fiduciary 
duty toward Plaintiffs and that public policy favors competition The Plaintiffs contracted with 
Defendant for Defendant to provide SB A financing and subsequent servicing of the loan, which 
Defendant accomplished, and the Plaintiffs agreed to pay back the loan. The parties never 
contracted for a prohibition by Defendant never to give competing loans during the life of the 
Plaintiffs' loan It is unreasonable for Plaintiffs to expect that Defendant would never give loans to 
competing businesses Further, a party may not acquire via a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing that which he could not obtain through contract negotiation Noting the Court's previous 
Page 23 of 30 
analysis, Plaintiffs have failed to establish facts which show7 that Defendant did anything to violate 
Plaintiffs' justified expectations Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs' third cause of 
action for the violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
CAUSATION 
In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail upon their claims against Defendant, Plaintiffs must 
show that Defendant's actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries Proximate 
causation is defined as, '"that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred "" Butter field v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) (quoting Mitchell v. Pearson, 
697 P 2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985)). Ordinarily, proximate cause should be submitted to the jury. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). However, "notwithstanding the 
general rule, it is also true that summary judgment may be granted on proximate cause in 
appropriate circumstances." Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 395 (Utah 
Ct App 2003) Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no evidence that establishes a 
direct causal connection between [defendant's] alleged negligence and the injury," and where the 
plaintiff cannot "show that a jury could conclude, without speculation," that the injury would not 
have occurred but for the defendant's breach Id See also Harhne v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 
1996) ("Issues regarding proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law when the 
proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law"); 
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Sumison v. Streator-Smith, Inc , 132 P 2d 680, 683 (Utah 1943) (summary judgment is 
appropriate because "where the proximate cause of the injur}' is left to conjecture, the plaintiff 
must fail as a matter of law") 
A. Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence that would allow a jury to conclude, 
without speculation, that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business to fail. 
Utah Courts have consistently held that juries are not "free to find a causal connection 
between a breach and some subsequent injury by relying on unsupported speculation " Mahmood 
v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1999). Expert testimony is required to establish causation 
unless "the propriety of the defendant's action 'is within the common knowledge and experience 
of the layman '" Shreiterv. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P 2d 570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). Expert testimony is particularly 
needed "where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades 
or professions, as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers." Id. at 574. "The 
need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act 
and the plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the injury." Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 12 P,3d 
1015, 1019 (Utah 2000) (citingRiggins v. BechtelPower Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash Ct. 
App 1986)). 
The case before this Court involves complex commercial matters regarding the factors 
involved in a movie theater's success or failure, including the theater's feasibility, competency of 
theater's directors, patrons' preferences, location of theater, choice of movies and concessions, 
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profit-loss of the theater, competition, market conditions, and the economy as a whole These are 
matters that are certainly not within the ''common knowledge and experience of the layman " 
Shreiier^ll P 2d at 574 The Plaintiffs have offered little evidence of causation other than 
Plaintiffs' own beliefs that Payson Theater drove them out of busiress Plaintiffs have failed to 
offer an expert who could assist the jury in determining causation without impermissible 
speculation The causal evidence Plaintiffs have tendered include the attendance numbers at 
Plaintiffs' theater before and after Payson Theater opened, a comparison of Star Wars movies, 
and a market analysis appraisal for the Payson Theater's feasibility See Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant }s Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business 
to fail The Plaintiffs have failed to address many issues of causation including consumer taste, 
business judgment in the operation of the theaters, and market factors, such as general economic 
conditions that may affect movie-goers and the opening of the Provo Towne Centre movie 
theaters to name just a few The Plaintiffs seem fixated on the above mentioned appraisal and 
believe that it demonstrates causation However, the appraisal does not address the need for 
competent directors to operate the Payson Theater and the possibility of its failure due to poor 
business judgment One appraisal commenting on the feasibility of Payson Theater is insufficient 
to establish causation, especially when that appraisal does not address the myriad of factors that 
comprise a successful business In short, the possible reasons a business may fail are many and 
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complex and a jury would require expert assistance in maldng such a determination The Plaintiffs 
have failed to provide any expert testimony, instead relying upon conjecture to sustain their 
causative argument From the evidence before the Court, it is clear that no reasonable juror could 
conclude, without speculation, that the Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' business to fail4 
B. Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Defendant's grant of the loan to 
Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business to fail. 
Not only must the Plaintiffs prove that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' theater to fail, 
Plaintiffs must establish the fact that because Defendant assisted Payson Theater in obtaining an 
SBA loan this caused Plaintiffs' business to fail In other words, Plaintiffs must provide evidence 
establishing a direct causal link that shows the giving of the loan to Payson Theater caused 
Plaintiffs' theater to fail. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support such a burden of proof in 
order to avoid summary judgment. 
In the Court's view, the grant of the Payson Theater loan is a step removed from the 
competition between the two theaters. It cannot be said that the grant of the loan to Payson 
Theater would result in a successful operation and profitability of the Payson Theater since, 
ultimately, its success and profitability were dependent upon the independent exercise of good 
business judgment by its owners and managers. Inasmuch as the mere grant of the loan did not 
4Plaintiffs are obligated to produce sufficient facts to 
defeat summary judgment in their opposition memorandum. 
Plaintiffs may not rely upon statements in oral argument that 
they will produce sufficient facts at trial, and thereby defeat 
summary judgment. 
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guarantee Payson Theaters' success, it cannot be said that the loan to Payson Theater caused 
Plaintiffs' injury To illustrate, if Payson Theater were operated by incompetent business people 
and ultimately failed due to the exercise of poor business judgment Plaintiffs would still be in 
business regardless of the fact that Defendant obtained an SB A loan for Payson Theater 
The grant of a loan to Payson Theater is not the cause of its success or Plaintiffs' failure, 
but such success or failure is the product and result of the operation of a business by the exercise 
of good business judgment under favorable market and economic conditions The many factors 
that comprise business success such as market forces, business judgment, quality of movies, 
location, etc are "efficient intervening cause[s]" that effectively eliminate the proximate cause 
connection. Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 106 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
defeat summary judgment The Plaintiffs have failed to produce adequate evidence establishing a 
direct causal link that would enable a jury to conclude, without speculation, that (1) Payson 
Theater did in fact cause Plaintiffs' business to fail, and (2) that Defendant's grant of the SB A 
loan to Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' theater to fail In order for a jury to make such a causal 
determination, the jury would require expert testimony to assist it due to the complex nature of 
the economic circumstances, which the Plaintiffs have failed to provide Taken together, this 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding causation to 
allow this issue to go before a jury Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint, and all 
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respective causes of action, based upon the lack of causation between Defendant's alleged 
conduct and Plaintiffs' injury 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendant was not Plaintiffs' agent and 
did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty The Court further finds that Plaintiffs have failed to 
produce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on both their intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations and violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing causes of action The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce adequate 
evidence to allow the issue of causation to go before a jury Accordingly, and respectfully, the 
Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and all respective causes of action along with 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims Plaintiffs attached to each cause of action. 
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this ^L/ "clay of July 2004 
s*. >'" l l 'V 
BY THE COURT-
JUDGE F R E D y HOWARD,1 ^  
/District Court/Judge ' - ^ 
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